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LOOKING AHEAD: CAPITAL SHORTAGES, TAX POLICY,
AND ECONOMIC PLANNING
Lewis D. Solomon* and Irv Belzer"
I. Introduction
In the midst of the immediate economic crisis, analysts have perceived a
new, long-term threat to the economic health and stability of the United States.
The possibility looms that the United States economy will be unable to provide
for new investment required by private businesses during the next decade.'
Increased dependence of American corporations on debt financing and the
problems faced by some corporations in obtaining funds on reasonable terms in
debt and equity markets lend support to the increasing evidence that America
faces an impending major capital shortfall. Although present plant overcapacity
probably negates such fears, at least in the next year or two, eventually this
capital shortage problem must be resolved.
Two different means of meeting these future capital needs have been
proposed. The so-called free market approach relies on the federal government
making additional funds available through a variety of tax devices. In lieu of this
approach, various modes of economic planning including credit allocation and
government financing of business have been suggested. The solutions should
avoid sweeping generalized demands for indiscriminate tax cuts for business, and
concentrate on those sectors and firms which require funds either to solve pressing
financial difficulties, thereby averting the threat of bankruptcy and the specter
of higher unemployment, or to meet future capital needs flowing from a soaring
demand for an entity's goods or services. Most importantly, standards are needed
to guide policy-makers in using federal tools and allocating resources to meet
these capital needs of American business.
Underpinning the technical analyses offered by many observers of the
capital shortage problems are a series of difficult value questions, particularly the
desirability of growth versus the need to redistribute income. The resolution of
these questions may direct the future of American society. Whether economic
and social institutions will be adapted to serve human needs constitutes one of the
most important issues of our time.2
* Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of La v; J.D., Yale
University; B.A., Cornell University.
** Third-year student, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law; B.A., Oberlin
College.
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1 Goldman, Is Liquidity of Business in Jeopardy?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1974, § 3, at 1,
col. 7; Massaro, Is the U.S. Facing a Capital Shortage?, CONFERENCE BOARD REcoRD, Jan.
1975, at 41; Stinson, Investors Beware: Liquidity Crunch Threatens, FINANCIAL WORLD, July
17, 1974, at 10; Where Will the Growth Capital Come From?, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 14, 1974, at
70 [hereinafter cited as Growth Capital?].
2 Solomon, Toward a Federal Policy on Work: Restructuring the Governance of Cor-
porations (to be published by GEo. WASH. L. Rlv. in early 1976).
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II. The Capital Picture Today
A. Overview
The present capital picture in this country is a starting point to understand-
ing industry's future capital needs and potentials. Corporations have become
increasingly dependent upon debt financing and especially dependent upon
volatile short-term debt, as internally generated funds have failed to meet corpo-
rate needs. With profit margins significantly reduced, the ability of corporations
to obtain debt financing and perhaps their ability to service present debts through
internally generated funds has decreased.
First, corporate demand for credit today is very high: sales of long-term
corporate instruments rose to record-breaking levels in 1974, s yet sales of short-
term instruments soared even higher.4 The ratio of debt to equity has also in-
creased. In fact the debt-equity ratio for U.S. manufacturing corporations has
more than doubled over the past two decades-from 21 percent in 1955 to 44
percent in 1973.' The high demand for debt resulted from three factors: (1)
declining business profits, (2) lagging productivity, and (3) increasing corporate
dependence on external funding sources.'
Business profits have fallen in recent years to a level described by some as
a "profits depression. ' This is a curious description, since the estimated 1974
pretax profits of all nonfinancial corporations from their domestic operations
were 16 percent higher than in 1973 and 46 percent higher than in 1972.8
However, if these profits are adjusted to exclude illusive inventory profits9 and tax
obligations, domestic profits of nonfinancial corporations did not rise at all in
1974.10 Rather, they declined by 20 percent and were smaller than 10 years
earlier when the dollar value of the output of these corporations was about half
3 Long-term debt rose to $35 billion in 1974, as compared to $5 billion in 1971 and $30
billion in 1973. See Growth Capital?, supra note 1; The Crunching Burden of Corporate
Debt, Bus. WEEx, Oct. 12, 1974, at 54.
4 The ratio of long-term bonds to short-term debt declined from 1:4 to 1:1 between
1963 and 1974. Address by Dr. William Freund, Vice President and Chief Economist of the
New York Stock Exchange, International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, Aug. 10,
1974, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Freund].
5 Id. at 3.
6 Address by Arthur F. Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Congressional Joint Economic Committee, Feb. 7, 1975, at 17 [hereinafter cited as
Bums].
7 Hearings on Tax Reform Before House Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
30-31 (1975) (statement of Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon) [hereinafter cited
as Tax Reform Hearings]. See also Cairncrass, Mr. Benn's Formula Faulty, Manchester Guard-
ian, May 3, 1975, at 8; Clark, Inflation and Declining Profits, LLOYDS BANK REv., Oct. 1974,
at 1; Profits: Reaching for the Bottom, Bus. WnEK, Aug. 18, 1975, at 53 (reporting that
perhaps profits have reached bottom and are beginning to move up); What the Marxists See
in the Recession, Bus. WEre, June 23, 1975, at 86.
8 Goldman, supra note 1; Growth Capital?, supra note 1.
9 These fictitious profits resulted from accounting practices that do not allow for the
fact that inventories are used and must be replaced at higher prices during an inflationary
period.
10 Burns, supra note 6, at 16. It should be noted that approximately 30 percent of
American corporate profits are from foreign operations. R. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL
REACH 258-59 (1974).
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what it is today." In fact, 1974 aftertax profits, adjusted for inventory gains,
barely equalled the amount of dividends which the companies paid their stock-
holders.'2 Furthermore, when allowance is made for the fact that depreciation
schedules are also based on historical rather than replacement costs, nonfinancial
firms actually paid out more in dividends than they earned from current domestic
production.' 3
The second cause of the high demand for debt by American business is the
decline in productivity. Output per man-hour in the nonfarm sector of the
private economy is lower now than it was two years ago,' 4 and the rate of gain
during the last 10 years is substantially lower than that recorded in the previous
decade.' Further, although total corporate financing 6 in the past three years
was triple that in 1961-63, manufacturers' shipments in the past three years were
only double that of 1961-63."' This decline can be attributed in large part to
obsolescence in the nation's plant and equipment." Despite substantial increases
in plant and equipment in the 1950's and 1960's, many plants were obsolete
almost as soon as they were built.'9 The result was that after 1972,20 American
business operated below full capacity,2 ' yet its capital base was insufficient to
meet demand.22
The third factor contributing to the high demand for debt, increasing
corporate dependence on external funding, is largely a consequence of over-
11 Id. See also Vartan, Is a Serious Shortage of Capital Developing?; Business Analysts
Disagree, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1975, at 23 C, col. 2.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Drucker, Managing Capital Productivity, Wall St. J., July 24, 1975, at 14, col. 3;
The Rising Toll of Obsolescence, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 30, 1974, at 27 [hereinafter cited as
Obsolescence].
15 Address by James J. Needham, Chairman, New York Stock Exchange, Economic
Club of Detroit, Sept. 9, 1974, at 8; Attali, Crisis Versus Change, Manchester Guardian,
Jan. 18, 1975, at 11, col. 1.
16 Equity, long-term debt, bank borrowings, and commercial paper.
17 Schmitz, Facing the New Normalcy in Corporate Finance, FiNANCAL EXEcU=TE, Nov.
1974, at 16.
18 A recent survey of plant and equipment obsolescence by the McGraw-Hill Publications
Company's economics department indicated that in November 1974, it would have taken an
investment of $197 billion to replace technologically outmoded facilities with the best available
facilities, a 32 percent increase from the replacement cost at the end of 1972. Obsolescence,
supra note 14.
19 American industry invested $382 billion in new plants and equipment between 1971
and 1974. Id. However, these were insufficient to meet the need for new types of plant and
equipment. In fact, the amount of outmoded, unproductive, and obsolete equipment used
by -American manufacturers is rising. Id.
20 In 1972, American manufacturing operated near full capacity. Hertzbert, Jacobs &
Trevathan, The Utilization of Manufacturing Capacity 1965-1973, SuRvEY oF CURRENT Bus.,
July 1974, at 47-57.
21 According to the most recent government statistics, productive capacity in manufactur-
ing was utilized at an overall rate of 78 percent as of December 1974, with seasonal adjust-
ments. See generally Clark, Plant on the Shelf, Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1975, at 10; Elia, Operat-
ing Rates Will Keep Shortages Away in Industry, Economists Are Inclined to Think, Wall St.
J., Sept. 8, 1975, at 27, col. 3; Manufacturing Capacity Utilization Drops Sharply, SuRvEY OF
CURRENT Bus., Mar. 1975, at 17.
22 See Hearings on Long-Term Economic Growth Before the Joint Economic Comm., 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 71, 72 (1974) (statement of Reginald Jones, Chairman, General Electric
Co.) [hereinafter cited as Econ. Growth Hearings]; Clark, Capital Shortage, Wall St. J.,
July 1, 1974, at 1, col. 4; The Debt Economy, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 12, 1974, at 44; The Massive
Task of Expanding, Bus. WEE., Sept. 14, 1974, at 108; Businesses Foresee Small Increase in
1975 Capital Expenditures, U.S. DEP'T OF CoMmERcE. NEws, Jan. 8, 1975, at 1.
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commitment to expansion from the mid-1950's through the late 1960's. Profes-
sor John Kenneth Galbraith has noted that during this period corporate giants,
often in the form of conglomerates operating in many different industries, edged
out the entrepreneur as the dominant American business form.2 3 The primary
goal of these giant corporations is growth, not merely profit, as with the en-
trepreneur.24 Their emphasis on growth created an expansion cult beginning in
the mid-1950's. Many businesses expanded beyond what they could finance from
retained earnings." The increasing obsolescence of plants and equipment, the
soaring costs of replacements due to inflation," and the expense of environmental
protection 7 exaggerated the problem. To meet their capital needs, corporations
turned increasingly to external sources of funding."8
An indication of America's corporate dependence on debt is the increase in
the debt-equity ratios of many corporations during the past two decades."
Between 1955 and 1964 the general debt-equity ratio rose slowly because busi-
nesses were able to meet capital requirements and finance expansion largely
through retained earnings.'" But in the decade 1965-75 came a turn for the
worse. Cash flow slowed while inflation soared. Debt issues more than doubled
those of the previous decade," and retained earnings could not keep pace.
Two main factors caused corporations to rely on debt instead of equity
financing. First, during the boom years of the late 1960's and early 1970's,
investors in the stock market tended toward those companies demonstrating the
greatest earnings-per-share. This "cult of performance" induced these favored
companies to avoid selling equity and to leverage per-share earnings despite their
ever-mounting debt." Second, by 1972-73, the following phenomena inhibited
many corporations from seeking new equity financing: 1) small investors fled
the equity market," and 2) institutional investors, which became increasingly
23 J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE iX-Xili (1973).
24 Id. at 92-99.
25 Burns, supra note 6, at 17.
26 Clark, supra note 22. According to recent government survey, business can expect
new plant and equipment expenditures to total $117.1 billion in 1975, 4.5 percent above
1974. But even if that much money is forthcoming, it represents a relatively small increase in
light of inflation's impact on capital spending needs. Id.
27 Environmental expense for the next decade is a hotly debated topic. For example,
the Council on Economic Priorities, a nonprofit research group, claims that corporate profits
in the oil industry will be cut by no more than one percent from 1974-83 for environmental
expense. Hill, Anti-Pollution Cost Called 1% Burden on Oil Profits, N.Y. Times, July 21,
1975, at 3, col. 1. But economists at the American Petroleum Institute project that gasoline
costs will rise eight times more than CEP projects for the period 1974-83. Cook, Oil Firms
Dispute Price Tag Put on Ecology Cleanup, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 22, 1975, at 16,
col. 1.
28 External sources financed only 29 percent of the total credit needs of nonfinancial
corporations in 1950, but by 1973 they supplied 77 percent of the total. Freund, supra note 4.
29 Burns, supra note 6; The Debt Economy, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 12, 1974, at 58.
30 Debt issues during that period totaled $90 billion, while equity issues came to only
$25 billion. But corporate earnings were high enough and dividends low enough that the
debt-equity ratio rose only 25 percent above the 1955 figure.
31 Debt issues rose to $231 billion from 1965 to 1975. Id. See also The Big Squeeze on
U.S. Companies, Bus. WEK, Sept. 22, 1975, at 50.
32 Solomon, Institutional Investors: Stock Market Impact and Corporate Control, 42
Gao. WASH. L. REv. 761, 775 (1974).
33 Address by J. Bucher, Member of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
MIdcontinent Trust Conference, Nov. 21, 1974, at 3; Solomon, supra note 32, at 762.
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powerful, concentrated their investments on the strongest growth issues.3 4 Those
in the so-called second tier became more and more dependent on debt financing.
Another indicator of the extent of corporate debt dependence is the short-
term borrowing market. Recently, blue chip companies such as Dupont35 and
General Motors 6 tapped the public debt market for the first time in years. The
resulting increase in competition for debt funds heightened the problems of less
creditworthy corporations, many of which could no longer obtain long-term
credit and therefore were forced to rely increasingly on short-term funding
sources.37 Reliance on short-term debt financing, however, subjects corporations
to the vagaries of the capital market which tends to favor highest quality, lowest
34 This growth of institutional investors has been deemed responsible for the two-tier
secondary securities market in which a few dozen corporations favored by the institutional
investors sell at very high price-earning multiples. Solomon, supra note 32, at 776; See also
Jones, Some Contributions of the Institutional Investor Study, 27 J. or FINANCE 305, 317
(1972). But see Wall St. J., May 23, 1975, at 1, col. 6; cf. DEP'T OF TEE TREASURY, PUBLIC
POLICY FOR AERICAN CAPITAL MARKETS 13 (1973): "Although such trades (relatively
large volumes of individual securities) may have a larger impact on the price of an asset than
smaller trades, there is no evidence that large trades now have a larger impact than they did
formerly when institutions were of less importance. The market has not become less liquid;
the demands upon the liquidity of the market have become greater."
The institutions which many feel dominate the stock market today are bound by the
Prudent Man Rule. See A. SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 611, 612 (Supp. 1975).
Section 404 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 most recently
provides that fiduciaries must act "with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."
This rule will probably impede the flexibility of pension funds and other large institutional
investors. See Shakin, Tough on Fiduciaries, BARRON'S, Dec. 16, 1974, at 11, who states:
'Trhe requirement of prudence in selecting securities for a pension portfolio may incline
managers to pass up those of many smaller companies-or even larger ones-which do not
possess the solid balance sheet of a Campbell Soup, for instance. It appears that the need
for investment caution will accelerate the tendency-which has already been under way for
some time-to shy away from smaller, unseasoned companies." Id.
In fact, due to the sharp setback in stock prices in 1973-74, the financial investors,
principally pension funds, have realized their investment decisions, directing their attention
away from equity investments as their principle holding to a conservative fixed income invest-
ment program in accordance with the "prudent man" rule as reemphasized in the Employee
Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974. Address by Henry Kaufman, 25th Annual
Investment Seminar in New York, Nov. 22, 1974, at 9-11. See Nassau, Fiduciaries Warned to
Perform as Prudent Experts, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1974, at 25; Steinberger, Fiduciary Standards
in Employee Benefit Plans, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 1975, at 20; Note, Fiduciary Standards and the
Prudent Man Rule Under the Employee Retirement Income Act Security Act of 1974, 88
Hav. L. Rv. 960 (1975).
To correct this trend away from investment in small companies, the authors support the
following proposals: (1) the Prudent Man Rule should be applied with regard to the entire
portfolio; see Belliveau, Discretion or Indiscretion, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1972, at
65; Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604 (1971); Lipton,
An Analysis: Prudent Man Test in Investments, N.Y.L.J. Jan. 15, 1975, at 1, col. 2; (2)
pension fund managers should be allowed to invest up to one percent of the assets of any one
pension plan in smaller companies, without regard to the Prudent Man Rule; see Address of
Paul Kolton, Chairman, American Stock Exchange, Nat'l Conference on Capital Invest-
ment and Employment, May 20, 1975, at 11; S.2842, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (sub-
mitted by Senator Bentsen); and (3) the law should force pension funds to put money
directly into the corporation rather than simply buying the corporation's stock from a third
party; see To the Rescue?, FORBES, July 1, 1974.
35 Schmitz, supra note 17.
36 Bulkeley, G.M. Set to Offer $600 Million of Debt Issues, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1975,
at 3, col. 1.
37 In 1974 alone, the major credit rating services downgraded more than 50 companies.
Bus. WEEK, Oct. 15, 1974, at 10. The ratio of long-term indebtedness to short-term debt
has declined from 1:4 to 1:1 since 1967. Freund, supra note 4. Where long-term exceeded
short-term debt by 40 percent in 1967, the two sources of corporate indebtedness were approxi-




risk obligations." The stress on the short-term debt market has generated con-
cern about the adequacy of resources of the American banking system, particular-
ly the liquidity of banks. 9 Continued corporate reliance on debt could produce a
general liquidity crisis."' Although economists are at odds as to the chances of
the occurrence of such a scenario,4 at least one indicator suggests that the Amer-
ican economy faces a liquidity problem. "Interest coverage," the relationship
between private companies' earnings and their interest obligations, is weak. 2
On the other hand, corporations do not need such large cash balances today
because of improved communications, faster banking services, and computerized
inventory management.4 Whether such technological developments have altered
the level of desirable liquidity divides sophisticated observers.
In assessing the impact of increased debt dependence, it is insufficient to
look only at the private sector. Some commentators argue that the federal gov-
ernment, which was responsible for lowering interest rates in 1975, may also
"crowd out" private borrowers.4 So far, there appears to be room in the debt
market for both blue chip issuers and the federal government to raise funds.
However, the federal government will apparently continue to stimulate economic
38 Bus. WEEK, Oct. 12, 1974, at 54.
39 See generally Hawkins, Banks Wait in Line to Borrow Money from Flintheart Lenders-
The Public, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1975, at 22, col. 1; Vojta, A Dynamic View of Capital Ade-
quacy, J. OF COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING, Dec. 1974, at 15; The New Banking: Scenario for
Disaster?, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 20, 1975, at 10; Are the Banks Overextended?, Bus. WEEK,
Sept. 21, 1974, at 52; cf. Address by Henry C. Wallich, Member, Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System, The American Bankers Ass'n, Jan. 6, 1975. See also Strachan, Banks
Driven to Less Advantageous Financing, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1975, § 3, at 2.
Large banks, which have had difficulty finding money to lend, are now experimenting
with new financing techniques, such as lease-backs and variable interest loans. See Kelly,
New Financing Techniques on Wall Street, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, Nov. 1974, at 30; Stabler,
The Big Float, Wall St. J., July 5, 1974, at 1, col. 8; Thomas, Offbeat Financing, BARuON'S,
July 8, 1974, at 11; Wall St. J., July 31, 1974, at 20, col. 1. See Address of Henry Kaufman,
Partner of Solomon Brothers, New York State Bankers Ass'n, Nov. 22, 1974. But see
Foldessy, Loosening Up: Bank Lending Officers Begin Easing Credit for Blue-Chip Clients,
Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
40 Liquidity is a word which is not susceptible to easy definition. When used as a synonym
for solvency, liquidity refers to a firm's capacity to raise the needed funds to meet its debts
as they come due. Goldman, supra note 1. Critical to the measurement of a company's liquid-
ity is neither the absolute quantity of its cash nor the short-term investments which can be
quickly and cheaply converted to money, but rather the company's ability to repay debts
which are due and owing. Id.
41 In its newsletter of March 1974, First City National Bank concluded that "corporations
are not unusually vulnerable to financial difficulties in 1974." Corporate Liquidity: No Sign of
Drought, FIRST CITY NAT'L BANK MONTHLY NEWSLETTER, Mar. 1974, at 12. Several other
observers, however, think a liquidity crisis is pending. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, Da-
MAND AND SUPPLY OF EQuiTY CAPITAL: PROJECTIONS TO 1985, at 21-23 (1974); Goldman,
supra note 1, at 70; Why an Equity Crunch May Be in the Cards, Bus. WEEK, June 16, 1975,
at 58.
42 In 1959, corporate earnings were still 10.5 times greater than interest payments. But
since then, the deterioration has been rapid with earnings only 3.5 times greater than interest
in 1971. Freund, supra note 4, at 3.
43 Goldman, supra note 1.
44 Hawkins, Crowded Out: Federal Credit Needs Push Many Companies Out of Bond
Market, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1975, at 1, col. 6; Nagan, Is Uncle Sam Crowding Out Other
Borrowers?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1975, § 3, at 1; Vartan, U.S. Debt Management, N.Y. Times,
May 7, 1975, at 55, col. 6; Vartan, Borrowing Dilemma: Huge Company and U.S. Financing
Could Raise Rates, Hurting Economy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1975, at 57, col. 6; Wolman, How
a Deficit Jostles the Capital Markets, Bus. WEEK, May 19, 1975, at 110; Wall St. J., Mar. 13,
1975, at 16, col. 1; see Address by Norman B. Ture, Nat'1 Conference on Capital Investment
and Employment, May 20, 1975, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Ture].
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recovery and simultaneously to incur deficits.45 In financing these large federal
deficits, the U.S. Treasury may preempt a large share of the funds avaialable for
private borrowers. 6 The result, according to advocates of the "crowding out"
theory, will be one of the following situations, or, more likely, a combination of
both: (1) interest rates will rise and some business borrowers will be pushed out
of the debt market; (2) the Federal Reserve System will be forced to supply
enough funds to meet the needs of the federal government and business."' If the
second situation should occur, the swift growth of the money supply is likely to
refuel inflation, forcing interest rates upward."
Some analysts, however, do not accept the "crowding out" theory. They
explain that private corporate capital spending, even after adjustment for in-
flation, reached peak figures in 1973 and 1974. 9 Although capital spending
declined in the first quarter of 1975, it still accounted for 10.4 percent of the gross
national product-a percentage which has varied little since World War II.5
In fact, total private savings in savings accounts, bonds, and other forms of in-
vestment have for the past two decades remained consistently at about 15 percent
of the gross national product.51 However, such statistics do not reveal that
capital investment in the United States constitutes a substantially smaller pro-
portion of the gross national product than capital spending in other industrialized
nations.5 2
In response, some commentators argue that other industrialized nations
have higher investment rates only because they have not yet experienced econo-
mies of scale which have occurred in the United States.5" The key issue, however,
is not whether this country can match the saving rates of other nations. Rather,
it is whether this country's saving patterns over the past two decades, if con-
tinued, will be sufficient to meet capital demands in coming years. It is this
question which has spawned several major studies of projected capital require-
ments and supply in the United States for the coming decade.
45 Hawkins, supra note 44; Vartan, supra note 44; Investment: How to Afford the Future,
TIE, July 28, 1975, at 45, col. 3; see Topic A: The Capital Gap, NnWSWEEK, Aug. 11,
1975, at 58 [hereinafter cited as Topic A].
46 Carson-Parker, Inside Wall Street: The Treasury Set on a Collision Course, Bus.
WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 32; Clark, Debt Dopesters: Analysts Agree U.S. Faces a Credit
Crunch, New Inflation-Or Both, Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1975, at 1, col. 6; Hawkins, supra note
44; Ture, supra note 44, at 4.
47 Hawkins, supra note 44.
48 Id.
49 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 151 (testimony of Joseph A. Pechman, Director
of Economic Studies, Brookings Institute); Clark, Capacity Questions: Firms Trim Spending
on Plants, But Analysts See No Problems-Yet, Wall St. J., May 21, 1975, at 1, col. 6; Martin,
Why There Won't Be a Money Crunch, Bus. WnE, July 14, 1975, at 16; N.Y. Times, May
10, 1975, at 35, col. 6; Topic A, supra note 45, at 59.
50 Clark, supra note 49, at 19, col. 1. Investments: How to Afford the Future, TIME,
July 28, 1975, at 54.
51 Id.
52 For the period 1960-73, capital investment in Japan was equivalent to approximately
35 percent of its GNP; in West Germany, 25 percent; in France, 24 percent; in Canada, 22
percent; in Italy, 20 percent; in the United Kingdom, 18 percent; in the United States, 15
percent. See Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 18 (statement of Secretary of the Treasury
William E. Simon); id. at 156-57.




In recent months, a number of economists have attempted, by various
analytical methods, to estimate the capital investments that will be required if
in the future we are to have full employment and an increasing growth rate.5"
Their numerical results vary, but nearly all of the studies indicate that present
growth and saving patterns will be insufficient to meet future capital require-
ments of American business."
1. Projections of Capital Needs, 1974-85
Two major studies project capital needs for the period 1974-85, one by
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)," the other by General Electric Cor-
poration." NYSE economists chose to compare estimated capital needs with
estimated private savings by using a scenario approach. After presenting a
"base case" scenario outlining the "most likely" projection of investment and
savings, the NYSE analysts proposed alternative scenarios to test the stability of
the "base case" conclusions. Throughout the study the NYSE analysts assumed
a 3.6 percent annual rate of real growth and a 5 percent annual rate of infla-
tion.59
In their "base case," the NYSE analysts first projected the total domestic
demand for funds between 1974-85. They considered each of the economy's
component parts-gross private domestic investment and net government financ-
ing operations (deficit financing and net borrowings from the public). They
determined the value of gross private domestic investment during the period
by aggregating estimates of business plant and equipment expenditures, resi-
dential construction, and investment spending by farms, nonbusiness, and non-
profit institutions (including investments in inventories). Basing their conclu-
sions on specific industry forecasts and on governmental studies, they projected
an increase in gross private domestic investment from $202 billion in 1973 to
about $560 billion in 1985.60 The driving force behind these projections is the
expected need to accelerate real business capital spending for both modernization
and new capacity by nearly 85 percent over aggregate expenditures for the period
1962-73.6"
In addition to their aggregate figures, NYSE economists broke down their
capital need projections into the following sectors: energy, basic materials pro-
54 A. BOSWORTH, B. DUESENBERRY & C. CARRON, CAPITAL NEEDS IN THE SEVENTIES
(Brookings Institute 1975); G. FRIEDMAN, FINANCING THE NEXT FIVE YEARS oF FIXED INVEST-
MENT (1974); N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, ELECTRIC COMPANY: THE NEED FOR EQUrTY CAPITAL
(NYSE Research Rep. 1975); N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, THE CAPITAL NEEDS AND SAVINGS
POTENTIAL OF THE U.S. ECONOMY: PROJECTIONS THROUGH 1985 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as CAPITAL NEEDS].
55 See Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 47 (App. A) (statement of Secretary of the
Treasury William E. Simon).
56 CAPITAL NEEDS, supra note 54.
57 Econ. Growth Hearings, supra note 22.
58 CAPITAL NEEDS, supra note 54, at 3.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 7-9.
61 Needham, supra note 15, at 7.
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cessors, transportation, communications and services, and all others. However,
they did not consider the needs of individual industries. On a cumulative basis
for the period, the energy sector alone-the gas and electric utilities, oil, and min-
ing industries-are expected to require capital investment expenditures of $800
billion, or double their needs over the past decade. But while this area's needs
are most dramatic, other sectors also have substantial requirements. It is pro-
jected that the basic materials industries--iron and steel, aluminum, paper,
cement, glass, and others-will spend nearly $330 billion from 1974-85, pri-
marily to overcome the capacity shortages currently limiting their output. The
transportation sector may require $225 billion, and housing demands will cumu-
latively total $1 trillion. Nonbusiness capital spending in the private sector-
e.g., farms, hospitals, educational institutions-while expected to increase more
slowly than in recent years, will still account for close to one trillion dollars in
cumulative demand for the next decade.62
Governmental requirements for capital funds could not be projected with
nearly the precision of private investment because of the uncertainty of congres-
sional and executive actions during a period which will include three Presidential
elections. However, the NYSE estimated that the combination of budgetary
shortfalls, other federal demands, and state and local credit requirements will
come to at least $175 billion during 1974-85 period.6"
An aggregate of all the major projected capital expenditures by private and
public sectors indicates that the cumulative demand for capital through 1985
will be $4.7 trillion. Unless these demands are reduced, the economy over the
same period must generate $4.7 trillion in business and personal savings to avoid
a capital shortage. NYSE analysts were unable to make such a happy prediction
as to business and personal savings.6"
General Electric economists used a computerized econometric model to esti-
mate capital needs and savings potentials from 1974 to 1985.65 Their assump-
tions were similar to those of NYSE analysts in all areas except for projected
annual growth.66 This difference accounted for the slightly lower General
Electric projection of capital needs for the period of $4.5 trillion.67
2. Projected Capital Sources, 1974-85
With regard to the ability of projected savings to meet the huge capital
needs during the 1974-85 period, both NYSE and General Electric paint a
bleak picture. The NYSE analysts based their projections of business savings for
the period of growth rates in the GNP from 1950 to 1973.6' Using this historical
62 CAPrrAL NEEDS, supra note 54, at 5-7.
63 Id. at 9-11.
64 Id. at 26-34.
65 Econ. Growth Hearings, supra note 22, at 72-74.
66 Id. at 72.
67 Id.
68 This time period was used to provide sufficient observations over all periods of cyclical
activity. Econ. Growth Hearings, supra note 22, at 73; see Vartan, supra note 11, at 23. New
York Stock Exchange analysts noted that while any assumption that historical trends will con-
tinue should automatically be suspect, the stability of the relationship between business savings
and GNP is quite pronounced. It has never fallen below 9.9 percent (reached only in the
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approach, they estimated that business will continue to be the primary source of
savings for the private sector of the economy from 1974 to 1985, accounting for
approximately $2.4 trillion from capital consumption allowances (i.e., deprecia-
tion charges) and another $550 billion from retained earnings. That comes to,
a total business savings of over $2.9 trillion for the period.
The NYSE expects annual personal savings to rise from $54.8 billion in
1973 to $135 billion by 1985, a cumulative total of more than $1.1 trillion. In
sum, business and personal domestic savings would total just over $4 trillion.
This is clearly not enough in the face of a projected capital need of $4.7 trillion.
These projects suggest a capital shortage of $650 billion over the next 10
years.
69
Projections for the same period by General Electric economists resulted in a
much smaller gap." General Electric also used historical data to estimate the
sources of gross private savings for the 12-year period. However, because of
its higher projected rate of growth, General Electric estimated that gross private
savings would total $4.3 trillion." This figure indicates a capital gap of only
$200 billion as compared with the $650 billion gap projected by the NYSE.
However, from a policy viewpoint, the precise dimension of a capital short-
age is not the issue. Whether the gap between savings and investment is $650
billion or $200 billion, the problem remains the same. As the NYSE analysts
stated:
It is more important to know whether a different set of "reasonable" assump-
tions would develop projections that would eliminate the prospective gap,
or reduce it to inconsequential or manageable proportions.
2
Neither the NYSE alternative scenarios"' nor General Electric's econometric
model suggest that such a reasonable set of assumptions exist. 4
The occurrence of a major capital shortfall would severely affect domestic
business activity. Small and medium size businesses would find it increasingly
difficult to obtain needed long-term debt. As credit availability declined, lenders
would increasingly put their funds with larger "safer" borrowers. Even larger
companies could experience difficulty obtaining funds due to a dwindling supply
of willing investors. Commercial paper too might become unavailable to all but
recession years of 1953 and 1970) and has only risen above 12 percent during the early years
of the Vietnam War (1964-1966). CAPITAL NEEDS, supra note 54, at 13.
69 It must be remembered that this is only the New York Stock Exchange's "most likely"
outcome, based on reasonable assumptions of future capital demands and savings availability.
The smallest gap produced by any New York Stock Exchange scenario was $396 billion.
New York Stock Exchange, supra note 54, at 19. Several economists argue that the New York
Stock Exchange's huge projected investment spending would generate a faster rate of growth
in gross national product than the 3.6% the study assumes. Jones, Business Capital Require-
ments 1974-1985, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, Nov. 1974, at 22-23; Growth Capital?, supra note 1.
70 Jones, supra note 69.
71 Econ. Growth Hearings, supra note 22, at 74.
72 CAPITAL NEEDS, supra note 54, at 17.
73 Id. at 19-25.
74 It should be noted that the saving gap or capital shortage projected in the two studies
represents a theoretical imbalance between investment capital demand and investment capital
supply. The gap itself will never actually show up; rather, it will be apparent after the fact
in the form of high interest rates brought about by intense competition for an insufficient
supply of savings and by reduced credit availability. Id. at 26.
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the major AAA credit-rated corporation. As lenders become increasingly wary,
they will probably shy away from buying "high risk" paper unless the borrower
has an unquestioned creditworthiness. And slower growth at home due to
decreased investment spending might mean higher unemployment, placing greater
strains on already overburdened social services, especially in central cities. In
short, the entire nation's well-being could be threatened by a capital shortage.
3. A Critical Assessment
Various economists disagree with the NYSE and General Electric findings. 5
Economists at the Brookings Institute state that America can finance its public
and private capital needs in the next decade, but just barely. They concluded
that the country's capital supply will be sufficient to meet requirements through
the 1970's if (1) the Government and agencies run an average annual surplus of
$ 11.5 billion, 6 and (2) the Federal Reserve System promotes low interest rates
with a relatively easy money policy.77
At first blush, Government surpluses seem to be an effective way to stimulate
investment. If the Government operates at a budgetary surplus and presumably
retires some of its outstanding debt, it frees funds for investment in private
securities. However, to the extent that taxes are used to finance federal surpluses,
,corporate and personal income would be reduced, and as a result private savings
would be lowered. Further, projections of the aggregate deficit from 1974 to
1976 are in the vicinity of $150 billion. To reach the average surpluses sug-
gested by the Brookings study, therefore, annual surpluses for 1977 to 1980 have
to be roughly $70 billion per year-hardly a likely result.
There is an even more basic fallacy in the Brookings approach which is
also common to the NYSE and General Electric studies. All of these studies con-
sider aggregate capital needs. In fact, capital needs vary widely from industry to
industry, even within single economic sectors. Some industries would have little
problem even if capital were in short supply during the next decades. Others
might be driven to the brink of ruin by the unavailability of financing. The
NYSE, in its effort to predict capital needs sector by sector, lumped utilities and
oil together under the single heading "energy." However, these two industries
have different types of capital needs, and for different reasons. Any workable
solution to capital shortage in either the utility or petroleum industry must take
account of each sector's particular capital picture.
Historically, the utilities industry experienced little difficulty meeting its
capital needs,7 " despite being the most capital-hungry industry in the American
75 Clark, Budgets and the Future, Wall St. J., July 21, 1975, at 8, col. 3; Vartan, supra
note 11, at 24; Wall St. J., July 29, 1975, at 16, col. 1; See Tax Reform Hearings, supra note
7, at 151 (statement of Joseph Pechman, Director of Economic Studies, Brookings Institute).
76 Wall St. J., July 29, 1975, at 16, col. 1.
77 Clark, supra note 75, at 8.
78 Id., Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1975, at 10, col. 1. But see A Reply from Brookings, Wall St.
J., Sept. 8, 1975, at 11, col. 1. See generally J. O'CONNoR, THE FIsCAL Caisis oF THE
STATE (1973).
79 M. WEIDENBAUm, FINANCING THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 23 (Edison Elec.
Institute 1974). See Hearings on the Growing Threat of a Domestic Financial Crisis Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Markets of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
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economy.8" But substantial increases in fuel and production costs in recent years
created a capital shortage in the industry.8 The inability of regulatory agencies
to respond quickly to requests for rate increases82 resulted in the utilities increas-
ingly committing capital to meeting costs, not to generating income83 in excess
of costs. To keep utilities competitive in the money markets, most state regulatory
agencies permit the companies to improve their capital picture through book-
keeping credits.84 However investors are not fooled by such ploys, and utilities
face the unhappy plight of neither being able to borrow at reasonable rates85 nor
to sell equity issues at prices in excess of book value. 6 While analysts disagree
with respect to the exact amount of the industry's capital needs in the next
decade, 7 most concur with the Edison Electric Institute that the utilities' capital
needs for plant expansion from 1974 to 1980 will be in the $277 billion range, 8
and that the industry will be required to externally finance one half of this
figure.
89
The capital requirements of the petroleum industry are even greater, par-
ticularly if this country wishes to achieve independence in this field."0 In order
75 (1974) (testimony of John V. Thornton, Vice President and Treasurer, Consolidated
Edison Co.); Ehrbar, Utility Stocks Aren't For Widows Anymore, FORTUNE, June 1974, at
105.
80 Gannon, A Friend in Need?, Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1975, at 1, col. 8; Loomis, For the
Utilities, It's a Fight for Survival, FORTUNE, Mar. 1975, at 97; Stinson, Electric Utilities-An
Endangered Species, FINANCIAL WORLD, Jan. 8, 1975, at 20; Address by Andrew Brimmer,
Member of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Wharton School Club of
Washington, May 22, 1974, at 41 [hereinafter cited as Brimmer].
81 WEMENBAUM, supra note 79, at 2; Gannon, supra note 80, at 2; Utilities: Weak Point
in the Energy Future, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 20, 1975, at 46 [hereinafter cited as Utilities]; Will
Government Bail Out the Utilities?, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 14, 1974, at 138.
82 The average time lag between a utility's request for a rate increase and the resolution
of that request is 9-12 months, although the lag varies greatly among the states. Brimmer,
supra note 80, at 4; Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 67 (testimony of John F. Childs,
Senior Vice President, Irving Trust Co.). Only 28 percent of the rate requests initiated during
1971-73 were completed in six months. One out of every four cases took longer than a year,
and the lag does not seem to have been shortened since 1973, although the size of rate hikes
has increased in recent months. WEIDENBAUM, supra note 79, at 18; Brimmer, supra note 80,
at 16-18.
83 Gannon, supra note 80, at 1, col. 7; Maneuvering for Utility Rate Hikes, Bus. WEEK,
Aug. 17, 1974, at 23.
84 Companies are allowed to include as income that capital which is tied up in construc-
tion. As a result, by 1974, 50 percent of the industry's after-tax income was mere paper profits,
as compared with nine percent in 1965. Utilities, supra note 81, at 42.
85 Long-term debt in the industry in 1974 totaled $60 billion, double what it was in
1967. Utilities, supra note 81, at 47.
86 Those companies which can no longer sell debt securities-either because no one will
buy them or because their debt-heavy capital structures won't allow it-must resort to selling
stock. That often means selling it 40 percent, 50 percent, even 60 percent below book value,
thereby diluting the value of issued and outstanding shares. Stinson, supra note 80.
87 See, e.g., ELECTRIC WORLD, June 1, 1974, at 285 (estimates capital need of $179 billion
for 1974-1980). Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust estimates $500 billion in 1974
dollars between now and 1985 to support an energy growth rate of 3-3.5 percent per year.
Energy's Needs, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 22, 1975, at 50. See also Letter from Richard C. Sparling,
Energy Economist, Chase Manhattan Bank, to the authors, Apr. 2, 1975; Cf. CHASE MANHAT-
TAN BANK, How MUCH OIL-How MUCH INVESTMENT (1975).
88 WETDENBAUM, supra note 79, at 87.
89 Id.
90 See Project Independence, an extension of § 2(a) of the Federal Energy Administration
Act of 1974, which requires "positive & effective action to conserve scarce energy supplies
[and] ... to promote the expansion of readily usable energy sources [and] to assist in develop-
ing policies & plans to meet the energy needs of the Nation." Federal Energy Administration
Act § 16 B, 5 U.S.C.A. § 761 (a) (1974). Many studies have been conducted to determine the
projection of capital needed for the period 1974-85. Although they may differ from each
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to double America's output of oil by 1985, projections indicate that the annual
capital requirements for the next decade must triple the industry's investment in
1975.21
This enormous sum of money required by the petroleum industry may in
part be obtained from external sources, but the major portion must be generated
internally from depreciation and retained profits.2 The industry will attempt to
generate additional funds by borrowing in the capital market, but firms face an
uncertain availability of capital.9" High interest rates may also make these loans
expensive.94 In the past, provisions for capital recovery such as depreciation,
depletion, and other write-offs have constituted an important means of internally
generating funds for the petroleum industry.95 By eliminating the depletion
allowance for certain oil companies, Congress drastically curtailed the effective-
ness of the petroleum industry's ability to internally generate funds for investment
and exploration. 9 According to the Chase Manhattan Bank, the action of
other, it is quite apparent that spending will be extremely large and a burden on the economy.
The Government's Project Independence Report estimated that more than $450 billion in
1973 dollars would be required to meet the needs of our nation's energy sector during the
period 1975-1985. See Hearings on Capital Requirements of Energy Independence Before
the Subcomm. on Energy and the Subcomm. on Financial Matters of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 '(1975) (statement by Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs). Other studies are considerably higher.
Chase Manhattan Bank estimates that in 1970 dollars, with a 5 percent inflation rate, the
petroleum industry will require $1.5 trillion worldwide between 1970 and 1985; with a 15
percent inflation rate, the need will be $3 trillion. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, supra note 87, at
7. See also N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, THE CAPITAL NEEDS AND SAVINGS POTENTIAL OF THE
U.S. ECONOMY (1974), estimating $884 billion in current dollars will be required to meet our
energy needs between 1974-85. See also Adams, Capital Expenditures Forecast, PIPELINE & GAS
J., July 15, 1974, at 17-21; Oil Firms to Hike U.S. Spending Over 50%, PIPELINE & GAS J.,
May 6, 1974, at 97. On May 7, 1975, Secretary of the Treasury William B. Simon estimated
before the Senate Finance Committee that at current dollars approximately $1 trillion was
needed over the next decade. The study, conducted by the First National Bank of Chicago,
estimated the minimum requirement to meet our energy needs in the decade ahead was $750
billion. See also Address by Gaylord Freeman, Chairman of the Board, The First Nat'l Bank of
Chicago, Nat'l Conference on Capital Investment & Employment, May 19, 1975, at 10, 13.
91 Through the initiative of the OIL & GAS J., Sept. 2, 1974, the results of a study
undertaken for Project Independence have been made available. The study predicts the
capital investment required to obtain U.S. crude oil at different rates of production over the
next 10 years. Present domestic crude oil production is about 10.5 million barrels per day. To
achieve this level of output, about $408 million is spent in necessary capital investments per
year. According to the report, even if the capital investment were to be tripled between 1974
and 1985, production will fall to 6.9 million barrels per day by 1985. In order to provide for
an increase in oil production, a huge rise in capital investment is needed. For example, if
production is to be doubled to 20.2 million barrels per day by 1985, annual capital expendi-
tures would have to rise from $408 million at present to $13.535 million in 1985. Hearings on
Capital Requirements of Energy Independence Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the
Subcomm. on Financial Markets of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 134-
36 (1975) (testimony of Barry Commoner, Director of Center for Biology of Natural Systems,
Washington U.). See also id. at 10, 38 (testimony of Secretary of the Treasury William E.
Simon, citing Chase Manhattan Bank estimates of a worldwide need for $400 billion to find 600
barrels of oil between 1970 and 1985); id. at 148 (statement of Senators Bentsen and Gravel,
citing National Academy of Engineering estimates of the need for coal by 1985, 1.2 billion tons
annually).
92 It seems most likely that, at the maximum, $240 billion will represent the money sup-
plied by external sources to meet the petroleum industry's capital requirement. CHASE MAN-
HATTAN BANK, supra note 87, at 7.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. These provisions were expected to furnish the petroleum industry with $260 billion
of the estimated requirement, provided they were not changed by governmental actions.
96 Limitations on percentage depletion in case of oil and gas wells. 26 U.S.C.A. § 613A
(1975). A decreasing deduction still can be used by small independent companies. See Hunt,
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Congress in repealing the depletion allowance will cost the petroleum industry $2
billion in 1975 due to increased taxes,9" which in turn will reduce the petroleum
companies' earnings and cash flow, forcing a cutback in capital outlays on oil and
gas exploration." Profits will increasingly become the primary source for meet-
ing the industry's financial needs. " However the estimated $2 billion increase in
taxes will adversely affect the industry's profitability, as will the worldwide re-
cession and the rising costs of raw materials.00 Earnings reports in 1975 have
indicated that petroleum profits entered a tailspin from the record breaking year
in 1974.'
From these descriptions, it is clear that the petroleum and utilities industries
have different capital requirements which call for different solutions. Aggregate
studies of capital needs and aggregate solutions to capital shortage are inappro-
priate in an economy as complex as ours.
Finally, critics of the capital scarcity theory note that in the aggregate, the
manufacturing sector of the American economy is operating at approximately
75 percent of capacity. "2 This underutilization of capacity thus obviates the need
for extraordinary business investment in excess of the traditional 15 percent of
GNP previously alluded to. Although other observers have disputed these statis-
tics,' once again careful disaggregation and industry-by-industry analyses are re-
quired. Furthermore, even if a firm or an industry has a surplus of plant
capacity, its plant and equipment may be obsolete.
Before appropriate solutions can be chosen for even a single industry's
capital problems, the alternatives must be examined.
II. Closing the Capital Gap Through Tax Subsidies-
The So-Called Free Market Approach
In light of the predictions that capital needs of American industries will
amount to over $4.5-trillion over the next decade, many economists agree that
private investment must constitute more than its present 15 percent of the
Conferees Clear $22.8 Billion Tax Cut; Oil Industry Taxes are Lifted $2 Billion, Wall St.
J., Mar. 27, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
97 Survey by Carl H. Pforzheimer & Co. of 43 important oil companies. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 27, 1975, § F, at 3, col. 1.
98 Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1975, at 2, col. 3. This trend on cutting back capital out-
lays is completely counter to the objectives of Project Independence seeking U.S. self-sufficiency
in energy by 1985. In fact, with the current cutbacks and others that may follow, the U.S.
may become more dependent on imported oil. Wall St. J., June 9, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
99 Before the passage of the Tax Regulation Act of 1975, Chase Manhattan Bank studies
indicated $460 billion, or nearly 40 percent of the industry's total financial requirements,
would come from the industry's profits. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, supra note 87, at 7.
100 Wall St. J., June 9, 1975 § H at 1, col. 6.
101 Wall St. J., June 9, 1975, at 3, col. 1. See also Smith, Oil Profits Slump Amid Debate
on Their Adequacy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1975, at 33, col. 1; Oil Companies Count Their
Profit Losses, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 11, 1975, at 34; Oil's Big Spill, FORBES, Mar. 5, 1975, at 21.
But see N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1975, at 27.
102 See note 21 supra.
103 RINFRET BOSTON ASsoCIATs INC., 1975 CAPITAL INVESTMENT SURVEYS (1975) (Per-
spective 5, Table 8); joint Hearings on Capital Requirements of Energy Independence Before
Subcomm. on Energy and Subcomm. on Financial Markets, Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1975) (statement of Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon); Clark,
Gaging the Gap, How Much Slack Is Left in the Economy? Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1975, at 1,
col. 6.
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GNP."" Even the Brookings Institute study suggests that some shift from con-
sumption to investment may be needed."' In fact, all of the major studies pro-
jecting capital requirements and supply for the next decade have concluded that
in order to achieve full employment and a growth rate consistent with past pat-
terns, capital investment must increase.'0
In response to these findings, the Treasury Department views the income
tax system as providing the mechanism for stimulating increased private
saving."0 Secretary of the Treasury William Simon points out that our tax
system-like any which relies on the income tax-is biased against saving. 8
In a recent statement before the House Ways and Means Committee he stated:
In general, our tax system inhibits savings because it promises to take away
a substantial part of the income from any amounts saved, thus reducing
the incentive for saving1 °9
The advisability of directing tax policy to favor investment remains a hotly
debated topic. Commentators who believe that income tax should be progres-
sive, with tax rates increasing as income rises, point to two main goals for tax
reform: (1) narrowing the gap between rich and poor, and (2) keeping the
federal tax base broad enough to pay for the needs of the growing public
sector. They argue that tax reform should primarily seek to achieve greater
fairness in the federal tax system and thereby restore public confidence in that
system."' "Tax loopholes," in the view of such commentators, constitute in-
direct, hidden subsidies which are distributed inequitably. As a result of tax loop-
holes, or subsidies, corporations, which are supposedly taxed on income at a rate
of 48 percent, actually pay an average rate of only about 35 percent."' Tax
subsidies are also erratically distributed among companies in the same industry."'
104 See Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 30 (statement of Secretary of the Treasury
William E. Simon); id. at 6 (statement of Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon).
105 Id. at 151 (statement of Joseph A. Pechman, Director of Economic Studies, Brookings
Institute); The Drive to Revamp the Corporate Income Tax, Bus. WFEK, July 28, 1975, at
58 [hereinafter cited as Drive to Revamp).
106 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 30.
107 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7; Drive to Revamp, supra note 105. See Kaufman,
The Case for Business Tax Reductions, N. Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1975, at 33, col. 3.
108 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 9.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1 (statement of Stanley S. Surrey, Professor, Harvard Law School).
111 Id. at 15; see Surrey, The Sheltered Life, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1975, § 7 (Magazine), at
23; Drive to Revamp, supra note 105, at 58; ef. Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at
159. See generally S. Suaxzy, PATHWAYS OF TAX RFFORM (1973).
112 Analysts who studied SEC figures for 1973 found that in the drug industry actual tax
payments by Baxter were 13.31 percent of corporate earnings; G. D. Searle, 32.7 percent;
Abbott, 32.7 percent; Johnson & Johnson, 46.7 percent; in automobiles, Chrysler, 19.1 percent;
Ford, 32.7 percent; General Motors, 46.4 percent. (Until 1968, when the Treasury published
the first tax expenditure budget, Congress and the agencies had no information on the amount
being spent in the tax system through "subsidies"; not until the Budget Reform Act of 1974 was
the item of tax expenditures included in the federal budget.)
As to the effects of tax breaks for individuals, the following example is instructive.
Assume that Congress passes a $1,000 tax deduction for expenses for home insulation as an
energy-saving measure--a goal which is seemingly in the public interest. The law's effect is to
give $700 to a homeowner in the 70 percent tax bracket, for that is the amount such a person
saves in taxes when he deducts $1,000 from his income. Only $140 in savings goes to a home-
owner in the 14 percent tax bracket, and zero goes to a homeowner whose income is so low
that he does not pay taxes.
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One of the leading opponents of tax subsidies, Professor Stanley Surrey,
warns that proponents of tax breaks for business should not be permitted to
chop more holes in a tax system which already overcompensates certain in-
dividuals and companies at the expense of other taxpayers."' On the basis of
this reasoning, Surrey and others".4 agree that major tax reform could be ac-
complished simply by reviewing and eliminating most deductions, exclusions,
and tax credits now on the books. Since tax breaks are in effect subsidies, they
should be tested by the standards applicable to direct federal subsidies." 5 That
is, if a tax subsidy would not today be proposed by the President or passed by
Congress, it should be eliminated. Any tax subsidy so justified should be con-
verted to a direct subsidy. Thus the public will become aware of its cost."'
Other antitax-cut commentators note that the 10 percent investment tax
credit and the liberalization of depreciation have already given an $8 billion
annual tax reduction to business which could be used for capital investment
needs."' No more special breaks are needed. They note that unemployment and
underemployment will continue at a high rate even after business enters a full-
fledged recovery from recession." 8 Therefore, they suggest that pursuing a
more expansive overall economic policy to reduce unemployment and to narrow
the gap between what the economy is capable of producing and what it is
presently turning out constitutes the best way to secure capital investment.
Tax cut proponents, however, argue that an immediate tax cut is necessary,
and that fairness, while a prime objective of tax reform, should not be the only
goal served by a tax structure." 9 Private interests, concerned with capital short-
age and falling rates of return on investment, want to use tax reform to provide
more benefits to business than were received in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975,
under which most benefits went to individual taxpayers. 2 ° Most of our national
savings occur in the business sector of the economy,"' and as business prospers-
the argument runs-more jobs are created. It is asserted, therefore, that favoring
the private sector, in particular the ability to generate more capital, comprises
the best means to achieve economic growth in which all will share, albeit
disproportionately, as greater gains will flow to capital interests."'
Those who consider tax reform an effective means for stimulating capital
113 Id.; George Meany, president of AFL-CIO, terms tax breaks to business a "trickle-
down" approach in which the workers end up paying the costs of the subsidies to business. See
Wall St. J., July 15, 1975, at 8.
114 See Silk, No Tax Breaks Needed, N. Y. Times, July 8, 1975, at 31, col. 5; Drive to
Revamp, supra note 105, at 59.
115 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 3.
116 Tax subsidies (incentives) are not included in income. Instead, they reduce taxable
income, thereby producing both financial assistance and freedom from taxation. That freedom
is more meaningful to the well-off individual than to one in the lower income brackets. Id.
117 See Silk, supra note 114, at 31.
118 See Barnes, Finding Capital for More jobs, Christian Sci. Monitor, May 14, 1975;
Cannon, When Recovery Comes, It Won't Mean Jobs for the Unemployed, Wall St. J., Apr.
29, 1975, at 1, col. 6; Golden, High Joblessness Expected to Persist as a Condition of U.S.
Through Decade, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1975, at 1, col. 1; Ulmer, Jobs for All: The Economics
of Full Employment, SocIAL POLICY, Nov. 1973, at 46; Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1975, at 10, col. 1.
119 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 31 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Covington
& Burling).
120 26 U.S.C.A. § 613A (1975).
121 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 16.
122 Id. at 31.
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formation have put forth the following proposals: integration of corporate and
personal income taxes, broadened capital gains treatment for investors, and
other tax breaks to encourage investment.
A. Integrating the Corporate and Personal Income Taxes
To stimulate investment, the Ford administration has proposed an integra-
tion of the corporate and personal income taxes. 2 Under the American tax
system, income earned by corporations is taxed twice-first at corporate level
and then again at the shareholder level, if and when earnings are distributed in
the form of dividends. Advocates of an integration of the corporate and personal
income taxes argue that double taxation tends to inhibit savings from flowing
into corporate equity investments, because such investment must earn a higher
level of income in order to produce the same return to an investor. 24 As corpo-
rate tax rates have risen in other nations, such as Canada, Great Britain, France,
Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Japan, these nations have integrated their
tax systems so as to eliminate much of the impact of the corporate double tax.'25
Each nation has used one of two basic mechanisms to replace corporate double
taxation: a credit to stockholders for dividends received or a deduction by the
corporation for dividends paid. A third possible mechanism would be full inte-
gration under which corporate tax would be eliminated and all earnings would
be taxed initially and directly to the entity's stockholders, whether or not the
earnings were actually distributed. 2 This system, however, faces difficulties
in implementation and, so far as can be determined, to date has not been adopted
by any country.
Under the dividend deduction system, the corporation could deduct from
its gross income as a business expense all or part of any dividend distribution to
its shareholders. The deduction in effect reverses the tax which the corporation
currently pays on such income.'27 Under this system, the initial effect would
123 See Drive to Revamp, supra note 105. One alternative for avoiding double taxation is
Congress' designating cash dividends on all stocks tax deductible as business expenses for the
paying corporation, just as interest on bond indebtedness is deductible. Barnes, A Do-It-Your-
self Way to Cut Taxes, Bus. WEEK., May 5, 1975, at 21; Barnes, One Way to End the Bear
Market, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1974, at 42, col. 6.
The alternative suggested by Henry Wallich of the Federal Reserve Board is that
dividends should be treated the same way as interest in the corporate income tax. Both should
be deductible or both nondeductible, with changes in the corporate tax rate to keep revenues
at present levels if that is deemed necessary. See Dale, Taxes and Building Corporate Capital,
N. Y. Times, June 22, 1975, § 3, at 15, col. 1.
124 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 13; id. at 48 (statement of George A. Max-
well, M.D., public witness). See Stronger Hints of Fiscal Stimulus, Bus. WEEK, July 14,
1975, at 47; WaR St. J., July 9, 1975, at 3, col. 2; cf. Address by John L. Sommers, Nat'l
Conference on Capital Investment and Employment, May 19, 1975.
125 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 16; Driv.e to Revamp, supra note 105, at 58.
With regard to the Canadian plan, see Bittker, Income Tax Reform, 35 U. Cm. L. Rav. 637
(1968).
126 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 16; Drive to Revamp, supra note 105.
127 For example, assume that a corporation earns $100, is subject to a corporate tax of
48 percent, and pays a dividend of $100. If the corporation takes a full deduction, the stock-
holders will pay tax on the $100 distributed to them, but the corporation, having distributed
all of its earnings, pays no tax. If the corporation distributes only $50, then the 60 percent
deduction will mean that the corporation pays tax on $40, the amount left undistributed.
Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 12.
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be to place more money in a corporation's hands, since such entity receives
a dividend deduction. Under either the deduction or credit system, however, a
corporation's dividend policies will determine whether the additional dollars end
up in the hands of shareholders or remain within the corporation.
2 '
Instead of giving a deduction to the corporation, the stockholder credit
system (also called the "grossed up dividend credit") gives a credit to the share-
holder as compensation for the tax paid by the corporation. In essence, it
achieves integration for distributed earnings, but does it at the shareholder's
end.'29 Under this system, the cash tax savings are initially placed in the hands
of the shareholders. But once again, by adjusting dividend patterns a corporation
could keep the extra dollars from its shareholders.'
In any of the integration schemes, the corporation has the final word on the
size of tax benefits going to investors. The corporation can cut those benefits by
withholding dividends. What difference does it make whether the stockholder
or corporation is the initial recipient of the tax break? The shareholder credit
method, which initially gives the tax break to the individual, may be more useful
with respect to tax-exempt institutions.'
3' The dividend deduction method
produces more immediate impact at the corporate level, which is probably the
area of most immediate need. But again it achieves an indiscriminate, across
the board approach, and may place funds in hands of firms and industries not
desirous of increasing capital investment.
Secretary of the Treasury Simon took note of this conflict in his statement
before the House Ways and Means Committee. He resolved it by recommend-
ing a combination of the two mechanisms, under which part of the double tax
would be eliminated by one method, and part by the other.' Simon also recog-
nized, as have other analysts,' 3' that the nation could not afford to eliminate the
double corporate tax completely in any short time period because of the enormous
revenue losses. He therefore recommended a six-phase program, with the first
phase effective January 1977."'
Even if implemented in six phases, however, Simon's program suffers from
defects common to any "tax breaks" aimed at stimulating investment. Tax cuts,
though specifically intended to increase the flow of savings and investment,
might actually be counterproductive. By reducing the Treasury's revenues, the
tax cuts would increase the borrowing needs of the federal government, thereby
increasing the federal deficit."
5 Even Secretary Simon, in recommending inte-
gration of individual and corporate taxes, emphasized that we must avoid federal
128 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 16; Drive to Revamp, supra note 105, at 50.
129 Using a form much like current W-2 reports of wages, the stockholder would add his
dividend receipt to the corporate tax paid on his share of the company's profits. He would
then add this "grossed up" amount onto his other taxable income, calculate his full tax, and
then subtract the withheld corporate tax as a credit. Drive to Revamp, supra note 105.
130 Id.
131 With respect to tax-exempt shareholders, the tax has already been eliminated at the
shareholder level so under the dividend deduction method which eliminates tax at the corporate
level, the result would be an elimination of all tax, not just an elimination of double taxation.
Id.
132 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7.
133 See Silk, supra note 114, at 31; Drive to Revamp, supra note 105.
134 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 19-20.
135 Silk, supra note 114. See also Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
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deficits.13" Yet tax cuts certainly could create them. Further, there is no guar-
antee that money saved through tax cuts will be invested. Neither the stock-
holder credit nor the dividend deduction plans contain controls on the use of ad-
ditional tax cut funds. In fact, each would allow a corporation to determine
whether the additional funds end up with its shareholders or with the corpora-
tion.
B. Increasing the Benefits on Capital Gains
Many analysts in the business community contend that a lessening of the
tax on capital gains would increase the incentive for individuals to save and in-
vest, and would help to unlock investments which people are hesitant to sell
because of the substantial tax which is levied upon gains."' This approach has
also been touted as an especially good one for encouraging the small investor
to return to the stock market." 8 The following are alternative methods for
reducing the capital gains tax:
1. Scaling Down the Capital Gains Tax According to the
Time a Stock Has Been Held'
A sliding scale of graduated capital gains taxes would be introduced, with
the effect that the longer an investor held an asset, the lower the proportion of
the gain such shareholder would be required to include in his taxable income.
This approach is designed to recognize the inflationary facts of life-that $100
invested in 1947 has a real value of approximately $50 today?4 Because gains
due to inflation are lumped for tax purposes in the one year in which the stock
is sold,' 4 ' the tax bite on inflation has an even more dramatic effect on those
investors who have held capital assets for many years.
2. Capital Gains Roll-Over Treatment
The tax on capital gains would be deferred so long as the proceeds from the
sale of eligible assets were fully reinvested in specified assets.' 42 Theoretically,
136 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 18.
137 Hearings Before Senate Finance Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1975) (statement of
Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon) [hereinafter cited as Senate Finance Hearings];
Address by H. Virgil Sherrill, Chairman, Securities Industry Ass'n, Nat'l Conference on Capital
Investment and Employment, May 20, 1975, at 11; Address by John C. Whitehead, Partner,
Goldman, Sachs & Co., Nat'l Conference on Capital Investment and Employment, May 20,
1975; Press release of Theodore Brody, president, General Telephone & Electronics, May 19,
1975.
138 Hearings Before Subcomm. on Financial Markets of Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 237 (1973) (testimony of Kahn, Neuberger & Berger) [hereinafter
cited as Financial Market Hearings].
139 Id., pt. 2, at 46, 93 (testimony of Ture), pt. 1, at 42-43 (testimony of Whitehead),
pt. 1, at 75 (testimony of Callaway), pt. 1, at 87, 89 (testimony of Burnham), pt. 1, at 111,
135 (testimony of Needham), pt. 2, at 223-26 (testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran).
140 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 19.
141 Id.
142 Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 137, at pt. 2, 93 (testimony of Ture), pt. 2, at 121
(testimony of Ford). Compare Crane, Capital Gain Tax "Freezes In" Few, N. Y. Times, Feb.
4, 1956, § 3, at 1, with N. Y. Times, May 20, 1975, at 3, col. 2. See Clark, An Alternative to




this "roll-over" treatment would exert an incentive for investors to remain active
in securities markets without exacting a penalty for capital asset transactions.
Both the scaling down and roll-over proposals, like most efforts to sweeten
capital gains tax treatment, encounter the objection that only the affluent will
benefit. In fact, capital gains rates, perhaps more than any other item, explain
why many wealthy people pay income taxes at rates far lower than their actual
income would seem to require." 3 In addition, none of the appreciation in value
of a capital asset is subject to income taxation if an individual dies holding the
asset. Consequently, the tax rate for a wealthy individual is reduced to zero on
the appreciation of capital assets if he holds them until his death and passes them
on to his heirs.' Therefore, any efforts to make tax treatment on capital gains
even more advantageous is viewed by some as utterly inequitable-a boon to the
rich.
145
3. Other Capital Gains Tax Proposals
A tax-free lifetime accumulation of a given amount of capital gains could
be allowed.'46 Investors would be permitted a lifetime exemption of perhaps
$50,000 or $100,000 of capital gains realized on corporate securities and perhaps
other specified types of property.
An annual exemption of a given amount of capital gains realized as a
result of securities transactions has also been proposed. 47 A variation on the
tax-free lifetime accumulation, this approach would exempt up to a certain
amount of capital gains-e.g., $5,000-per year. This method, with its relatively
low annual limit, would be far more significant to persons of modest incomes
than to those with large portfolios.
4
A number of people have suggested increasing the amount of capital losses
which may be offset against ordinary income. 4 The limit on capital losses which
might be offset against ordinary income would be increased from $1,000 to
$10,000 or $20,000. Some would advocate full offset of losses against ordinary
income."'
The primary objection to these three suggestions aimed at middle-income
Americans is that they will not achieve their desired effect. Internal Revenue
Service data demonstrates that only 6.5 percent of tax returns at the $10,000 in-
143 Tax Reform Hearings, supra note 7, at 18-19.
144 Id.
145 Id.; Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 137, pt. 2, at 94 (testimony of Prof. Richard
A. Musgrave, Harvard University).
146 Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 137, pt. 1, at 160 (testimony of Wood), pt. 2, at
121 (testimony of Ford), pt. 2, at 93 (testimony of Ture); Address by Whitehead, supra note
137, at 3.
147 Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 137, pt. 1, at 160, 172 (testimony of Wood), pt.
2, at 47, 93(testimony of Ture), pt. 2, at 121 (testimony of Ford), pt. 2, at 127 (testimony of
Malone).
148 Id., pt. 2, at 93 (testimony of Ture).
149 Hearings on the Impact of Institutional Investors in the Stock Market Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Markets of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 9 (testimony of Regan), pt. 1, at 29, 43 (testimony of Whitehead), pt. 1 at 111 (testimony
of Needham), pt. 1, at 143 (testimony of Kolton), pt. 2, at 93 (testimony of Ture), pt. 2, at
121 (testimony of Ford).
150 Id., pt. 2, at 93 (testimony of Ture).
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come level and 12 percent at the $20,000 level contained capital gain income.'
Over 50 percent of returns at the $100,000 and above level contained capital
gains. The average capital gain in 1971 did not reach $3,000 until the $20,000
income level. But the average capital gain for incomes between $50,000 and
$100,000 was $20,000.12 Overall, more than half the capital gains are received
by those with incomes of $30,000 or more, only two percent of the families pay-
ing income tax. 53 It hardly seems, then, that reducing the percentage of includ-
able income from capital gains would be the most efficient means of encouraging
investment by those making less than $30,000 per year.
Another alternative is to scale down the capital gains tax on certain stocks
bought and sold within a given time period. "4 A category of companies would
be selected to qualify as "small companies," perhaps using the price of the
companies' shares or the size of a firm's gross revenues as a measure. 55 Upon
sale, stocks of these companies would be accorded more favorable tax treatment
with respect to long-term capital gains, provided that the owner bought and sold
the stock within five years. In the case of short-term gains, only a certain
percentage-perhaps half-of the gains would be included in ordinary income.
If there were a loss, it could be deducted from ordinary income, but limited to
$25,000 for any single stock issue, and a maximum of $100,000 over the five-year
period.
C. Other Tax Breaks Aimed at Encouraging Investment
Increasing the dividend exclusion 5 . has been suggested. The current $100
dividend exclusion from federal income taxes would be increased to $200,"5r or$500.158
Another suggested change is to permit commissions on securities transactions
to be deducted against ordinary income. 9 Commissions paid by investors would
be treated in the same way as other investment expenses, and not as part of the
purchase or sale price of a security, as they are presently.
Ending the withholding taxes on dividends paid to foreign investors could
attract foreign long-term capital to U.S. business. 6 This move would be par-
ticularly effective in attracting so-called petrodollars, since oil producers are not
subject to income taxes at home against which they could get credits for U.S.
taxes.'61 To satisfy those concerned about foreign control of U.S. corporations,
the withholding tax might be waived only for those investors who would own
151 Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 137, at 19.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Financial Markets Hearings, supra note 138, at 237.
155 This arrangement is similar to that under INT. Ruv. CODE OF 1954, § 1244.
156 Financial Markets Hearings, supra note 138, pt. 1, at 111 (testimony of Needham), pt.
1, at 143 (testimony of Kolton).
157 Id., pt. 1, at 43 (testimony of Needham), pt. 1, at 143 (testimony of Kolton).
158 Id., pt. 1, at 43 (testimony of Whitehead).
159 Id., pt. 1, at 111 (testimony of Needham), pt. 2, at 121 (testimony of Ford).
160 Id., pt. 1, at 8 (testimony of Regan).
161 Hearings on Long-Term Economic Growth Before the Joint Economic Comm., 93d




less than a specified percentage of a U.S. company. Despite this option, many
seem to fear (a fear more ephemeral than real) a flood of foreign investment .
2
Totally eliminating federal corporate tax for certain industries which
already avoid many tax obligations through tax loopholes 63 has been proposed in
a bill introduced by Senator Lee Metcalf. The bill states that the utilities industry
receives enormous tax breaks through hidden loopholes, and that taxes on utilities
should be formally eliminated so that the public is aware of the utilities' preferred
position.
6 4
These last several proposals suffer from the same defect as the items men-
tioned above, in that (1) the reduction in taxes increases the likelihood of fed-
eral deficits, and (2) there is no guarantee that money saved through the tax
breaks would be used for capital formation.'6 5
One of the most significant aspects of the "tax subsidy" approach to capital
shortage is its inherent assumption that after an initial capital infusion resulting
from the tax breaks, the market should and will take over capital allocation.
This assumption fuels the long-standing controversy between those who favor
"market systems" and those who would prefer long-term national economic
planning and more direct government involvement in the economy.
The argument in favor of market systems is bottomed on the concept that
the individual should have the right to pursue his own interest in a relatively un-
trammeled manner, because that is the best way to promote the general good.'66
The market mechanism allegedly has the advantage of harnessing self-interest
162 Letter from Robert A. Gerard, Director, Office of Capitol Markets Policy, U.S. Dep't
of Treasury to authors, June 25, 1975. See also Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1975, at 8, col. 1; see
S. 425, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) introduced by Senator Harrison Williams; Hearings on the
Foreign Investment Act of 1975 Before Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This bill would, re-
quire more information on the identity of domestic and foreign investors in U.S. corporations
and would give the President the authority to screen and block foreign investment to avoid
takeovers. Jones, U.S. Companies Oppose Restrictions on Investments by Foreigners, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 6, 1975, at 55, col. 3; Jones, Ford Aides Fight Senate Bill with Plan to Control
Foreign Investment in U.S., N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1975, at 45, col. 2; Stabler, Infusion Con-
fusion: Foreign Capital, A Key to Rise of Early U.S. Now Stirs Misgivings, Wall St. J., Mar. 5,
1975, at 1, col. 1; Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1975, at 4, col. 3; Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1975, at 6, col 4.
But see Rohatyn, Getting Foreign Cash, N. Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1975, at 19, col. 1, suggesting that
a foreign investment review board could review all proposed foreign investments aggregating
over 20 percent of any corporation with over $10 million in assets, but that we should continue
to encourage benign foreign investment to bolster the economy. See also Rose, The Misguided
Furor About Investments from Abroad, FORTUNE, May 1975, at 170, suggesting that there is
much less foreign investment in this country than it would seem from the publicity given to
such investment, id. at 172, and that foreign nations with investments in the U.S. are more likely
to remain friendly to this country, id. at 173; Snyder, Danger: OPEC Might Not Invest Here,
N. Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1975, § 3, at 10, col. 3; Katzenbach, International Markets as a Source
of Capital, FINANCIAL EXECUTIvE, Nov. 1974, at 44.
163 121 CONG. REC. S 9418, (daily ed. July 29, 1975).
164 121 CONG. REc. S 14090-91 (daily ed. July 29, 1975) (S. 2213 introduced by Senator
Metcalf).
165 Drive to Revamp, supra note 105, at 50.
166 W. WRISTON, BLUE EAGLES AND DijX Vu (1975); Bender, Murphy of G.M. Lambasts
National Economic Planning, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1975, at 41, col. 1; Francis, Debate on
Long-Term Economic Planning Begins, Christian Sci. Monitor, May 27, 1975, at 21, col. 3;
Frieman, A Planned Economy in the U.S.?, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1975, at 1, col. 7;
Gannon, The Idea Shortage: Perplexed Economists Hunt for Ways to Cure U.S. Economy's
Woes, Wall St. J., May 9, 1975, at 1, col. 6; Jameson, Taking New Aim: French Five-Year
Plan Misses Major Targets, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1975, at 1, col. 1; Shabecoff, Planning the
Economy: Ford Defends Free Markets, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1975, at 51, col. 6.
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to serve the public. In a market system, government serves to compel competing
groups to play by the rules of the game but does not intervene in the process of
distributing national wealth."' Indeed, advocates of the market system point
out that government intervenes too much in the market place by overregulating
business.
6 8
The "market" argument is criticized today by those who say that the
United States never will have a pure market system, and that if we are going to
have some government intervention, it should at least be planned, efficient in-
tervention. 6 During the industrialization process of the past century, efficiency
and growth were given preference over redistribution of income and equality of
result. It was hoped that society could best upgrade the lot of the underprivileged
not by redistributing wealth but by expanding the pie through rising productivity
and profits.?'7 This concept was, at least in part, abandoned in the New Deal
era. Since that time the Government has attempted albeit in a disorganized man-
ner to regulate business practices and to improve the lot of the have-nots vis-a-
vis those who succeed in the market place. A problem is that to date the federal
government merely reacts to crises rather than anticipating and avoiding them.''
The result is a complex of unconnected aid programs to various industries and
companies, some of which no longer require such aid. Advocates of economic
planning point to the existence of technology with which to plan and avoid gov-
ernmental waste, as evidenced by the efficient planning mechanisms of large
corporations.' Indeed, some state that we must acknowledge that other large
corporate bodies will plan and intervene, that their interests are explicitly not
ours as citizens, and that planning as a mode of political power cannot be
denied.7
In an effort to mobilize the available expertise, Senators Humphrey and
Javits introduced the Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Bill in May
1975.Y 4 The bill calls for the gathering of economic information so that the
President and Congress will have a total picture of the national economy and
167 A. SMITH-BARNEY, RESEARCH FROM WASHINGTON 3 (1975).
168 Id. at 3.
169 Javits, The Need for National Planning, Wall St. J., July 8, 1975, at 12, col. 4; Lens,
Socialism for the Rich, THE PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1975, at 13; Schlesinger, Jr., Laissez-Faire,
Planning and Reality, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1975, at 8, col. 4; The Case for Governmental
Planning, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1975, at 14, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Case for Planning]; A
New Push Behind Econoic Planning, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 10, 1975, at 21 [hereinafter cited as
New Push]. See also M. LINDBECI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEWV LEFT 33 (1971).
See generally W. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).
170 PoLA.yi, supra note 169; SmTH-BARNEY, supra note 166; at 3; Silk, Market vs. State,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1975, at 43, col. 2.
171 Javits, supra note 169, at 12; Case for Planning, supra note 169, at 14.
172 The market argument also fails to account for the existence of huge multinational
corporate conglomerates, which are far from being regulated by the federal government.
Indeed these transnational systems often control government decision-making. Professor John
Kenneth Galbraith attributes the success of these huge "technostructures" to their ability to
plan. Rather than merely responding to express consumer needs, these multitentacled creatures
cajole consumers into new markets and infiltrate government agencies which are authorized to
control such markets. In the face of this situation, perhaps planning is the key to more
effective governmental intervention. J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE
92-99 (1973).
173 Krieger, On Social Policy, N. Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1975, at 35, col. 2.
174 S. 1795, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).
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areas of crucial concern." 5 Although it specifies no national economic plan,
critics call it "a program designed to destroy the free market system and with it
our personal liberty."' 76 These critics will perhaps be even more vociferous in
the face of more specific plans for governmental economic intervention.
III. Government Assistance to Private Business---The So-Called
Planning Approach
Financial difficulties encountered by floundering firms and the capital re-
quirements of the dynamic sectors of the American economy have spurred vari-
ous proposals for direct federal involvement: credit allocation, government
financing of business, and loan guarantees. To date, all such suggestions have
failed to define a suitable standard to govern the allocation of funds; such
decisions have been relegated to ad hoc administrative determination.
A. Credit Allocation
In the absence of government policies to the contrary, the large corporate
business sector of the economy has received preferred treatment from financial
lending institutions.'77 When credit is tight, funds are channeled into this sector
to the exclusion of the sectors of America's dual economy which lack clout, such
as housing, agriculture, and small business.'78 These groups, as a rule, also bear
the brunt of general monetary policies aimed at deflating the economy, such as
the raising of interest rates and tightening of credit availability. 7 ' In response to
this situation, other industrialized nations, including Japan, Italy and Sweden,
have established specific borrowing privileges for those sectors which are hardest
hit by general credit squeezes.""
In fact, rather than merely reestablishing the neutrality of general monetary
policy, these nations designed policies which have created preferred sectors in the
economy. For example, Sweden has expanded mortgage loans to boost the
housing sector, while diverting loans from private business. Italy has encouraged
plant construction in its southern regions, and Japan has allocated moneys
within the private industrial sector to maximize economic growth.' 8' Since
national goals vary so widely, it is difficult to predict whether policies adopted
abroad would be effective in our national context. Further, some countries take
their credit preferences more seriously and make more forceful efforts to dis-
175 Id. § 203; see Case for Planning, supra note 169; New Push, supra note 169, at 21.
176 WRISTON, supra note 169, at 3; Schlesinger, supra note 169. See generally F. HAYEK,
THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
177 STAFF OF THE HOUSE 'COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 9 2 D CONG., 2 D SEss.,
REPORT ON FOREIGN EXPERIENCE WITH MONETARY POLICIES TO PROIOTE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL PRIORTY PROGRAMS 4-6 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter cited as MONETARY POLICIS
REPORT].
178 Id.; STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANK-
ING & CURRENCY, 9 3D CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTION: REFORM AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 25, 37 (Comm. Print 1973).
179 Id.
180 MONETARY PoLICms REPORT, supra note 177, at 1-2.
181 Id. at Chs. III-V.
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tribute loanable funds than others. Nevertheless, there is a surprising agreement
among other Western nations that government should undertake credit pref-
erences. 82 A consensus also exists as to the order of announced preferences:
exports, housing, state and local governments (where they exist), underdeveloped
regions (where they exist), small business (including agriculture), and large
corporate business." 3 Three major techniques exist for achieving neutrality in
monetary policies or for creating preferred sectors. These involve: (1) asset
reserve requirements, (2) government borrowing in the capital markets and
relending to preferred sectors, and (3) competition by government financial in-
stitutions for primary savings so that captured funds can be loaned to the pre-
ferred sectors.
Under the "asset reserve requirements" approach, governments and central
banks place an asset reserve requirement on every financial intermediary such
as banks and insurance companies unless a certain percentage is invested in the
desired sector. 84 For example, if the national goal were to channel 25 percent of
total savings into housing, every financial intermediary might be forced to place
in reserve 25 percent of its assets unless it invested that amount in housing. This
system has achieved favorable results in Sweden, where a set share of funds goes
to housing even in the midst of credit crunches.' 85 It is a straightforward form of
assistance to specified sectors which does not require the complex regulations
involved in U.S. aid to housing, and does not discriminate between smaller and
larger savers. Each can receive the same interest returns, since the housing in-
dustry is assured of an investment flow. The drawbacks of this system center
around value questions. Is it fair to force savers to invest in housing? Is it not
fairer to tax everyone to support housing rather than to limit the options of only
the savers?
The technique of "government borrowing and relending" was the one
adopted in Italy to increase the industrial base in that country's southern
region.'86 Italy's version of this instrument includes a very large interest subsidy,
as much as five percentage points below market rates to preferred sectors.'8" In
addition to lowering the cost of borrowing in the preferred sector, this system
gives the government the power to determine exactly what projects are to be
undertaken within the preferred sector. Since the government programs offer
such reduced interest rates, projects vie for government loans and are usually
postponed until such loans are available. The result, as critics point out, is that
the long-term lending market in Italy is now virtually nationalized. Private
lenders cannot compete with the government sector.'88 To date neither industry
nor income in the south have caught up with the north in Italy. Such changes
take time, however, and depend on more than credit distribution.
Japan created "government savings institutions" to distribute funds to
182 Id. at 178. See also Address by Donald R. Hodgman, Symposium on Credit Allocation,
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Feb. 10, 1975.
183 MONETARY POLICIES REPORT, suPra note 177, at 2.
184 Id. at 11.
185 Id. at 31.
186 Id. at 39.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 49.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
preferred sectors." 9 Savings in Japan flow into the treasury (of which the Bank
of Japan is a part), which relends to financial intermediaries designed to aid
various sectors. 9 ' The public intermediaries lend to private intermediaries who
relend to prescribed industries and companies. The result of this system is that
both private financial intermediaries and private companies are deeply in debt
to the government, making the entire economic system extremely sensitive to
government directives. Rather than using this system to aid areas of social
priority, Japan uses it to maximize economic growth. Considering that it has
experienced the fastest growth rate in the industrialized world, Japan's methods
deserve some consideration.
To date, calls for credit allocation in this country have encountered vocif-
erous opposition. 9' Opponents of preferential treatment for economic sectors
describe the horror of a situation in which the hand of the federal government
would be at the jugular vein of our economy. A family's decision to purchase a
home or automobile would be at the mercy of the prevailing federal policy
governing credit preferences. 2 Perhaps a less emotional and more practical
criticism of federal credit allocation is its technical, operational difficulties.'
In order to allocate credit effectively, the allocaters' information must be com-
plete and accurate. There is some question as to whether any single person or
committee could collect and master enough information to determine with any
acceptable degree of accuracy where and when investment should be made.
Further, some critics argue that market economic forces are so strong and human
ingenuity so great that no government monetary regulation can be devised
which could not be circumvented.' A corollary to this view is that although
monetary markets can be affected by special monetary policies, attempts to cir-
cumvent these policies will produce so many unintended and undesired con-
sequences that the costs of such policies would outweigh the benefits.'95
Advocates of credit allocation emphasize that the absence of programs
designed to create credit priorities does not mean that credit priorities will not
be created. Commercial banks give first priority in their lending activities to
the credit needs of their oldest and largest business and industrial customers.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Representative Reuss was forced to withdraw a national credit allocation bill which he
introduced in early 1975, H.R. 212, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see Hearings on H.R. 212
Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency
and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); N. Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1975, at 39, col. 6; Wall
St. J., Feb. 5, 1975, at 20.
Representative Reuss then introduced the Credit Uses Reporting Act of 1975, H.R.
6676, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), which would require disclosure of uses of commercial
bank credit. However, this bill too has encountered staff opposition. See STAFF OF HousE
COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 94Tr CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON CREDIT USES
REPORTING ACT OF 1975 (Comm. Print 1975); Wall St. J., May 13, 1975, at 6, col. 2.
192 See The Siren Song of Credit Allocation, FIRST NAT'L CrrY BANK MONTHLY ECON.
LETTER, Feb. 1975, at 12. See also Bucher, A Firm No to Credit Allocation, J. OF COMMERCIAL
BANK LENDING, Jan. 1975, at 23; cf. Hearings on an Act to Lower Interest Rates and Allocate
Credit Before Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking &
Currency, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-24 (1975) (testimony of Secretary of the Treasury William
E. Simon) [hereinafter cited as Interest Rates Hearings].
193 Bucher, supra note 192, at 28-29.
194 MONETARY POLICIES REPORT, supra note 177, at 3.
195 Id.
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Whatever loan funds remain are distributed among other borrowers, with long-
term loans occupying the lowest priority in their lending activity. Proponents of
credit allocation note that our present system simply has not provided adequate
borrowing power to sectors such as housing. 9 Countering the argument that
government-allocated credit would impede personal freedom rests the fact that
the federal government already attempts to influence borrowing through general
monetary policies and specific pressures. 9 The problem is that such policies
and regulations are haphazard and fall more harshly on businesses, particularly
within the market sector, lacking sufficient internal sources of funds. A general
scheme of credit allocation might, under this view, make lending more equitable.
B. Government Financing of Private Business
In the winter of 1974-75, political and business leaders revived the idea
of a federal agency to advance funds to business to curb spiraling unemployment.
Such an agency could also meet capital shortages faced by American business.
Before analyzing such proposals, the two previous federal instrumentalities, the
War Finance Corporation and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, will
be discussed.
A great strain was placed upon the banking resources of the United States
during World War I by wartime government financing and expanded private
industrial activity. 9 To assist banks in furnishing essential credit for private
business and to bolster the financial system of the United States, the War Finance
Corporation was created in 1918.' 99
The War Finance Corporation (WFC) provided financial support and
196 Hearings on the Credit Allocation Act of 1975 Before the House Comm. on Banking,
Currency & Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1975) (statement of Representative Hanna-
ford).
197 Although the Federal Reserve Board opposes any formal system of credit allocation by
commercial banks, the Board took an active role in counseling commercial banks regarding
loans to real estate investment trusts and utilities in 1974. Interest Rates Hearings, supra
note 192, at 66 (testimony by Andrew F. Brimmer, former member of the Federal Reserve
Board). See also Gannon, Fed Adopts Contingency Plans to Rescue Ailing Firms to Prevent
Economic Shock, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1975, at 3, col. 2; The Federal Reserve: Doctor to Sick
Companies? FoRBEs, Feb. 1, 1975, at 18. The FORBES article notes that:
1) Bank lending to real estate investment trust soared from $6.5 billion to $11.4 billion
at a time when many REITS were close to bankruptcy and few were good credit risks;
2) Bank loans to public utilities jumped from $5.9 billion to $8.4 billion at a time when
utilities were frozen out of the long-term debt market by high interest rates and their well-
publicized problems;
3) Money-losing W. T. Grant was able to borrow $600 million from a consortium of the
country's largest banks at five percent interest, when it had little more than its accounts receiv-
able as security.
Political analyst Joseph C. Harsch has pointed out:
There is an absence in Washington of true long-term planning. Everybody is
planning as best he or she can-for next election day. President Ford is doing what
seems at the moment to be likely to help his party on election day. Everyone in
Congress is doing the same. Neither is thinking carefully about what today's decision
will do to the shape of the American Community and its life-style 20 or 50 years
from now.
Harsch, The President's Problem, Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 4, 1975, at 12, col. 3.
198 D. FULLER, GOVERNMENT FINANCING OF PIVATE ENTE.' aRsE 38 (1948).
199 Act of April 5, 1918, ch. 6, 40 Stat. 506.
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credit for key industries essential to the war effort."0 The WFC obtained funds
to finance its activities from two sources: the Treasury Department subscribed
to $500 million in capital stock, and $200 million was raised through a public
sale of WFC bonds to individuals and corporations.2"' Funds advanced were
repaid and operations of the WFG produced substantial earnings for the Gov-
ernment." 2
The WFC provided credit through three mechanisms:
(1) Making loans for up to five years to commercial banks which had
previously extended credit, by loans or the purchase of obligations, to businesses
with operations important to the war effort;23
(2) Making advances for up to one year when fully secured to savings
institutions (savings banks, savings and loan associations, banking institutions,
or trust companies) when deemed necessary for or contributory to the war effort
or important for the "public interest."2 4
(3) Making loans, in exceptional cases, directly to essential businesses
otherwise unable to obtain funds on reasonable terms through the usual com-
mercial banking channels. Such advances required a positive recommendation
from a federal department or agency directly concerned with an applicant's
operation and adequate collateral security.0 ' During the period from May
1918 to November 1918, applications for funding by the WFC came primarily
from public utilities, coal mining companies, and enterprises engaged in the
manufacturing of war materials.0 ' After the First World War, the WFC assisted
in the financing of the exports of agricultural and other products.0 '
The Great Depression brought into existence, in 1932, the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation (RFC), the most significant involvement to date by the
federal government in financing private industry. During the operation of the
RFC from 1932 to 1953, the Corporation disbursed over $40 billion to financial
institutions and other business entities.08 President Hoover, in creating the
200 Mitrisim, Emergency Federal Financial Assistance to Private Enterprise: A Selective
Examination of Past Loan & Loan Guarantee Programs of the Federal Government, CONORES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Nov. 29, 1974, at 2-3.
201 Act of April 5, 1918, ch. 6, §§ 2, 12, 40 Stat. 506. See also MONETARY POLICIES RE-
YORT, supra note 177, at 2.
202 FINAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY WITH RECARD TO THE LiQUmA-
TION OF THE WAR FINANCE CORPORATION 19-20 (1943) [hereinafter cited as WFC LIQumATION
*REPORT]. The magnitude of earnings which exceeded $64 million must be discounted by the
cost of the money to the Treasury which supplied the capital to the Corporation. The War
Finance Corporation continued in existence until 1929, with final liquidation and abolishment
of the Corporation taking place on July 1, 1939. Id. at 20-22.
203 Act of April 5, 1918, ch. 6, § 7, 40 Stat. 506.
204 Id. § 8.
205 Id. § 9.
206 With respect to public utility applicants, the directors of the WFC were to satisfy
themselves that the facilities afforded by these companies were necessary or contributory to
the operation of enterprises directly engaged in the manufacturing or transportation of war
essentials. The Corporation, under its war powers, advanced public utilities nearly $39 million.
With reference to war essential industrial applicants, the WFC often secured the required,
funds from other governmental agencies more directly concerned with an applicant's output.
WFC loans to these war essential industries amounted to over $23 million. WFC LIQUmATiON
REPORT, supra note 202, at 8-9.
207 Id. at 12-13.
208 FINAL REPORT ON THE RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION 47 (1959) [herein-
after cited as RFC REPORT].
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RFC, viewed the agency as a defensive measure to protect the credit machinery
of the United States from liquidation should the depression not subside."' 9 The
RFG was empowered to make loans directly to banks, insurance companies, and
other financial institutions. RFC could neither buy equities nor make loans in
other business entities. Funds so lent were required to be fully and adequately
secured with a maturity not to exceed three years. 10 Although a limitation also
existed on the RFG's ability to make loans to any one institution, allegations of
favoritism in the distribution of funds were made, especially after the discovery
that a considerable portion of RFG loans to financial institutions had gone to
three large banks.21
President Roosevelt vastly expanded the powers and financial resources of
the RFG. From an original authorization in 1932 to issue $500 million in equity
to be purchased by the Department of the Treasury and to borrow $1.5 billion
by publicly floating debentures, the RFG eventually borrowed over $54 billion,
of which $51 billion came from the Government.1 2 In March 1933, the
RFG was authorized to invest in preferred stock issued by commercial banks
and trust companies."' One year later, Congress, in response to complaints that
the banking system could not adequately meet the demand for credit, permitted
the RFG to make direct loans to business enterprises, apart from financial in-
stitutions. Such loans required adequate security and a showing that a banking
institution could not provide credit to a firm. Limitations, subsequently modi-
fied and lengthened, were imposed on the amount and the maturity dates of
loans.
21 4
209 See generally A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 427 (1958); A.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 236 (1957) [hereinafter cited as OLD
ORDER CRISIS]. In February 1932, when the RFO commenced business, the unemployment
figure reached 20 percent and total reserves of the member banks of the Federal Reserve
System were within $50 million of the lowest amount legally permitted. See J. JONES & E.
ANGLY, FIFTY BILLION DOLLARS, My THIRTEEN YEARS WITH THE R.F (1951).
210 Act of June 20, 1932, ch. 8, § 5, 47 Stat. 1.
211 Id.; OLD ORDER CRISIS, supra note 209, at 238.
212 Act of June 20, 1932, ch. 8, § 2, 47 Stat. 1. See RFO REPORT, supra note 208, at 33-34;
Mitrisim, supra note 200, at 5.
213 JONES & ANGLY, supra note 209, at 20. The Emergency Bank Act of March 9, 1933,
ch. 7, § 304, 48 Stat. 6, provided that if the Secretary of the Treasury believed a bank needed
capital funds he could, upon the approval of the President, request the RFC to subscribe to
preferred stock of such bank or make a loan secured by such stock. The Act of March 24,
1933, ch. 4, 48 Stat. 21, limited this power to cases where the preferred stock was nonassessable.
See also FINAL REPORT ON THE RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION, PURSUANT TO § 6
(c) REORGANIZATION PLAN No. 1 OF 1957 4 (1959) [hereinafter cited as REoRG. PLAN RE-
PORT]. Beginning in March 1933 and continuing until 1945, the RFC authorized subscriptions
for nonassessable preferred stock of 4,202 bank and trust companies. The amount authorized
was $859,592,768, of which $782,206,636 was actually disbursed. On December 31, 1945,
there remained outstanding $118,317,931 in preferred stock, with $657,578,063 of the
original disbursements having been liquidated and $6,310,642 charged off. RFC REPORT,
supra note 208, at 55, 56, 222-23.
214 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 7, § 5d, 48 Stat. 1108-13. This new section allowed the
RFC to make direct loans to any industrial or commercial business established prior to January
1, 1934. Revision of RFC Act, January 31, 1935, significantly altered the 1934 amendment.
By eliminating the restriction on loans to businesses established prior to January 1, 1934 and
the previous limitation on the amount any corporation could borrow. The maturity deadline
was extended to not later than January 31, 1945. Revision of RFC Act, April 13, 1938
expanded the authority under § 5d to include the purchase of securities and obligations of any
business enterprise. The security standard was changed from "so secured as reasonably to
assure repayment" to "of such sound value, or so secured, as reasonable to assure retirement
or repayment." An Act approved June 25, 1940 extended maturity deadline to January 31,
1955. See REORG. PLAN REPORT, supra note 213, at 10, 65-66.
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The loan policy of the RFC was based on four factors: public benefit
derived from a loan, the soundness of a prospective borrower, assistance to small
businesses, and participation of other financial institutions. The RFG sought
to allocate funds to firms to prevent business failures which would heighten
unemployment rates. Stated differently, the RFC looked to whether the granting
of a loan would have a favorable impact on the economic life of a community.
The RFC, however, generally did not rescue businesses that were on the verge
of bankruptcy." 5
The RFC placed considerable emphasis on the financial soundness of a
business and its future potential as a successful operation. The RFC assessed the
inherent soundness of an enterprise and the probability that funds advanced
would be repaid. Each loan applicant had to demonstrate that credit was un-
available at usual rates through customary banking channels and that funds
sought would promote operating efficiency and financial viability. In making
so-called nonbankable loans, the RFC looked at many of the same factors
used by commercial banks in analyzing credit risks, including: (1) prospects of
future earnings, (2) financial position, (3) collateral requirements, (4) man-
agement, (5) business of borrower, (6) purpose of loan, (7) customer relation-
ship, (8) size of borrower, and (9) loan maturity. The RFC construed the
concept of credit risk with a more "liberal" eye and made long term loans which
commercial banks were unwilling to undertake.2 16
The RFC emphasized the development of small business enterprises. Almost
nine out of 10 loans made by the RFC went to small businesses, as defined by
the RFC, and were in an amount of $10,000 or less. 1
The RFC also sought to make loans in cooperation with other lending
institutions. Involvement of the RFC reassured other lenders, which in turn
enabled business entities to tap other sources and reduce the amount of funds
advanced by the RFC. Participation, therefore, served to reduce the potential
loss exposure faced by the RFC.215
Despite the benefits flowing to businesses from the RFC, increasingly the
RFC came under attack for alleged corruption." 9 Any future government
finance operation must require insulation from political interference.
During the winter of 1974-75, a clamor arose in political and business
215 RFC, INFORMATION REGARDING LOANS TO BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, CIRCULAR No.
13, at 1 (rev. 1946) [hereinafter cited as LOANS INFORMATION]; Stafford, How the RFC
Chooses Borrowers, BANKING, Aug. 1949, at 46, 119.
216 Glover, Industrial Loan Policy of RFC, HARv. Bus. REv., June 1936, at 465-66. See
also LOANS INFORMATION, supra note 215, at 2-4.
217 Stafford, supra note 215, at 46; RFC: Haven for Businessmen in Need, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Oct. 21, 1949, at 22.
218 Immediate participation loans, those made in cooperation with financial institutions
taking part of the loan disbursed by the RFC, functioned by several means. In most instances
the RFC disbursed the entire amount of the loan and immediately sold the agreed-upon
portion to the participating financial institution. Deferred participation loans were serviced
by the financial institution with an agreement with the RFC under which the R.FC agreed
to purchase an agreed-upon portion of the outstanding loan upon the request by the lending
institution. REORG. PLAN REPORT, supra note 213, at 66-67.
219 See Bolles, Corruption in Washington and What Lies Behind It, HARPERS, Jan. 1952,
at 27; Fulbright, Moral Standards of Government Conduct, VrrAL SPEECHES, Apr. 15, 1951,
at 386; Symington, The Ethics of Organized Influence, Vrr SPEEcHEs, Nov. 15, 1971, at 75;
Report on Influence, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 1951, at 61.
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circles to revive the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Congressmen intro-
duced bills to establish a federal agency empowered to make loans directly to
business concerns unable to obtain funds. Senator Mike Mansfield, Senate
Majority Leader, introduced a bill to authorize a new federal corporation to
lend money and enter into loan guarantees to business enterprises for any of the
following purposes:
(1) to enable a business to finance plant construction, conversion or
expansion, or the acquisition of equipment, facilities, machinery,
supplies, or materials;
(2) to supply a business with working capital; or to aid a business in
the payment of current debts or obligations, if such aid is con-
sidered by the board of directors of the federal corporation to be
in the public interest.220
Loans would be made for a period not to exceed 10 years with provision for
a limited extension of maturity date, and would require full and adequate secu-
rity. As a prerequisite for obtaining funds, a business concern would be required
to demonstrate that funds were unavailable from other sources on reasonable
terms. The Mansfield bill provided that the corporation would be financed by the
issuance of $2 billion in stock in the United States Government. The corporation
could also issue debt obligations in an amount not to exceed three times its
government subscribed capital. The Ford administration has also proposed a
$100 billion program for energy projects thought too risky or too vast for fund-
ing by private capital markets. This program would establish a new federal
corporation which would, among other things, make direct loans to firms and
also guarantee private loans. 21
220 S. 4039, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See generally Christian Soi. Monitor, Dec. 10,
1974, at 8, col. 1; The Slump Sparks Talk of New RFC, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 1, 1974, at 34. Cf.
Mooney, Who Should Get Bailed Out? N.Y. Times, May 18, 1975, § 33, at 14, col. 1. The
Democratic Party at its 1974 Mini-Convention adopted the following:
To assist faltering businesses in a time of deepening recession, we urge Congress to
revive the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as a means of meeting legitimate
credit needs in the private sector.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1974, § 1, at 73, col. 6.
221 Agnew, Financing for Energy Projects, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 15, 1975, at 103; Burnham,
$100-Billion Body to Aid Energy Is Urged on Ford, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1975, at 1, col. 6;
Farney, Ford Proposes $100 Billion Plan for Energy Aid, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1975, at 3,
col. 1; Gapay, Ford May Trim Rockefeller's Proposal for Public Firm to Fund Energy Projects,
Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1975, at 3, col. 2; Naughton, Ford Calls Plan on Energy Vague, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 23, 1975, at 19, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1975, at 1, col. 3. See Burnham,
Ford Sends Congress Plan for $100 Billion Energy Corp., N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1975, at 50,
col. 4; Burnham, Energy Authority Under Broad Attack, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1975, at 22, col.
3; Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1975, at 4, col. 3.
The new corporation would go out of business after 10 years and would focus on three
areas: developing the application of new technologies for the production and transmission
of energy, constructing nuclear power plants, and developing other power sources. But see
Burnham, Greenspan Asserts Energy Loan Plan Could Have Potential for Corruption, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 6, 1975, at 7, col. 1.
Senator Henry Jackson has proposed that the federal government guarantee $6 billion in
loans to private companies for the construction and operation of synthetic fuel plants and the
speedier development of oil from shale and the conversion of coal into oil and gas. Cowan,
Congress Is Asked for Fuel Funding, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, at 51, col. 1; Gapay, Financing
New Energy, Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1975, at 40, col. 1.
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Outside Capitol Hill, businessmen led by Felix G. Rohatyn, a partner in
Lazard Freres & Co., have also advocated the creation of a new Reconstruction
Finance Corporation.2 2 Rohatyn's proposal contemplated two functions for
the agency: (1) lender (or guarantor) of last resort, (2) purchaser of equity
instruments in the form of common or preferred stock to facilitate a resolution
of financial problems, including ever mounting debt burdens. Rohatyn felt that
equity investments would be on a temporary, two- or three-year basis. Henry
Kaufman, a partner of Salomon Brothers, has advocated a Federal National
Development and Investment Bank for the purpose of supplying new capital, not
for bailing out ailing business.22 To aid the beleaguered utility industry, a Utility
Finance Corporation, funded by the United States Government, has been
suggested. Such an agency would make direct loans and purchase equity
issues.2
24
Proposals for federal financing instrumentalities have received a negative
response from several quarters. Defenders of a market financing concept advance
two arguments. First, as previously discussed, the present capital market con-
stitutes the best mechanism for allocating funds, and a new agency could not
apportion capital better. A public financing corporation, moreover, would reach
staggering proportions and encourage inefficiency and poor management, as large
numbers of firms would seek assistance . 2  As Senator William Proxmire, Chair-
man of the Senate Banking Committee, put it, part of the free enterprise
system is "the right to fail." The Government should not be required to bail
out mismanaged companies or keep unsound industries going. According to
Senator Proxmire, "If a company can't make it in the market place, my posi-
tion is that it ought to be allowed to expire. Having something like the RFC
is a formula for protecting buggy-whip manufacturers.1 26  Secondly, current
financial problems, it is believed, are of a different magnitude than those
encountered in the Great Depression. 22 ' A sufficient number of programs already
exist to meet the difficulties experienced by firms. Such programs include the
222 Rohatyn, A New F.F.C. Is Proposed for Business, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1974, § 3,
at 12, col. 3. See also An Interview With Felix Rohatyn, Fo"Es, Feb. 15, 1975, at 46.
Rohatyn recommended an initial capitalization of $5 billion in common stock subscribed to
by the Treasury, and the authority to issue up to $10 billion in U.S. guaranteed obligations.
This could be achieved by a levy of one percent of pretax profits of all enterprises earning over
$1 million per annum. The Treasury should be reimbursed in less than five years following
this plan. Legislation was also introduced in New York State to create a state-owned bank
to fill unmet capital needs of private industry. The Bank of North Dakota, founded in 1919,
currently is the only state-owned bank in the United States. Loans to farmers and farm-
related industries and housing loans constitute the bulk of funds made available by the Bank
of North Dakota. Fowler, State-Held North Dakota Bank Is Under Study As a Model Here,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1975, § C, at 11, col. 5; Harvaez, State-Owned Bank Urged As a Way
to Help Economy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1975, § M, at 35, col. 7; Karp, Hard-nosed Socialism?
The Bank of North Dakota Knows How to Make a Buck, BARRON'S, June 2, 1975, at 5;
Mathews, The Only Bank of Its Kind, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1975, at 4, col. 4.
223 Kaufman, In Opposition to a New RFC, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1974, § 3, at 12,
col. 3.
224 Gannon, A Friend in Need?, Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
225 Kaufman, In Opposition to a New RFC, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1974, § 3, at 12, col. 3;
Mooney, supra note 220; Resurvey of the Old RFC, TimE, Jan. 16, 1975, at 86. See also
N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1975, § 3, at 13, col. 1.
226 Large, The Clamor to Revive the RFC, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1974, at 4, col. 4. See
also Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 10, 1974, at 8, col. 1.
227 Kaufman, supra note 223, at 12, col. 2; Mooney, supra note 220.
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Small Business Administration, the informal powers of the Federal Reserve
Board to put pressure on member banks to keep open lines of credit or advance
more funds,2 ' and various ad hoc federal loan guarantees. 29 Senator Lloyd
Bentsen has proposed an energy development bank to encourage the construction
of plants for alternative energy sources. As part of the program the Government
would guarantee up to 70 percent of the investment made by private business."'
These piecemeal, ad hoc approaches suffer several deficiencies. Such
approaches put Congress in the position of being a forum for corporations seek-
ing a bailout.2"' Loan guarantees and other emergency measures may only con-
stitute a temporary palliative. 2 Proponents of a program for credit allocation,
use of loan guarantees, or a revival of the RFC must face the challenge of a need
for a systematic approach by the federal government to the capital needs and
difficulties facing American business. This dilemma and the gathering move-
ment for national economic planning hopefully will produce a more searching
scrutiny of the type of industry and firm the federal government should assist
and, if help is deemed necessary, the most desirable type of aid. This avenue of
inquiry may promote a more searching examination of the entire American
economic and social system.
Whether the United States uses an ad hoc or systematic approach, a need
exists for standards to determine what industries and firms will receive govern-
mental funds or tax breaks. As preliminary criteria, the following are suggested.
First, in a time of high unemployment and underemployment, a need exists to
encourage labor-intensive firms and industries. 2 ' Second, using a cost-benefit
analysis, the federal government may discover that it may be cheaper to bail
out firms than to allow them to go under, and then support or find jobs for such
additional unemployed workers.2"4 Third, if the United States is to have con-
228 Rumors have abounded that the Federal Reserve System applied subtle pressure to
force banks in a lending consortium to go along with a refinancing package for W.T. Grant.
Banks Line Up Support for Grants, COMMERCIAL & FINANCIAL CHRONICLE, Dec. 16, 1974,
at 3. See note 197 supra. See also Gannon, Fed Adopts Contingency Plans to Rescue Ailing
Firms to Prevent Economic Shock, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1975, at 3, col. 2.
229 A prime example of a federal loan guarantee program was the Emergency Loan
Guarantee Act of 1971, pursuant to which the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation obtained a
guarantee of $250 million in loans by a consortium of banks. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1841-52 (1971).
The critical argument used by proponents of the guarantee program was the need to save
jobs of Lockheed employees and to prevent secondary economic and social consequences in
communities where Lockheed, at that time the nation's largest defense contractor, was located
and among its suppliers. See, e.g., The Case for Helping Lockheed, Bus. WEEK, May 15,
1971, at 41-42. The Wall Street Journal reported that former President Nixon desired to
broaden the effect of the proposed legislation for Lockheed so as to authorize up to two billion
dollars in loan guarantees for companies whose collapse would be expected to hurt the economy
of the United States or a region. Wall St. J., July 26, 1971, at 3, col. 3. Another example of
a proposed program would provide Federal guarantees for bonds issued by electric utilities.
EDISON ELECTRIC, FINANCING THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 4-6 (1974) (discussing plan
of William Rosenbert, chairman of Michigan Public Service Comm.).
230 joint Hearings on Capital Requirements & Energy Independence Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Energy & the Subcomm. on Financial Markets of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1975). See also 190 CONG. REC. 452 (1975) (remarks
of Senator Bentsen).
231 Large, The Clamor to Revive the RFC, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1975, at 4, col. 4.
232 See, e.g., Why Lockheed Needs Another Rescuer, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 17, 1975, at 2.
233 Gannon, When Employment Comes It Won't Mean jobs for Many Unemployed, Walt
St. J., Apr. 29, 1975, at 1, col. 6; Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 3, 1975, at 12.
234 See, e.g., Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1975, at 4, col. 2.
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tinued availability of cheap raw materials, particularly energy,"' assistance must
be forthcoming to secure a strong energy base. Fourth, as the United States
increasingly becomes a service economy,"' those service firms which may also
serve sound ecological ends should be encouraged. Fifth, America's great
strength in the world trading market lies in technological and other advanced-
knowledge industries, such as computers. Assistance might be given to such
industries, if necessary to further our world position. Finally, attention should
be paid to encouraging innovation throughout the economy. This aim may in-
clude aiding small and large business.2"'
Whether government financial assistance will in the end constitute a "back
door" means to nationalize firms constitutes another problem. The example
offered by the Labor Government in England might point in this direction. In
1975, Prime Minister Wilson led the way to the creation of a new agency, the
National Enterprise Board, to implement a plan to promote greater national
ownership of industry and to help modernize industry by the purchase of shares,
through a variety of means, in unspecified corporations.238 To date, the Board's
235 Barraclough, The Great World Crisis I, N.Y. Rv. oF Boocs, Jan. 23, 1975, at 14.
236 Solomon, Toward a Federal Policy on Work: Restructuring the Governance of Corpo-
rations (to be published by GEo. WASH. L. REv. in early 1976).
237 The argument for encouraging small enterprises is usually couched in terms of the
virtues of a decentralized capitalism and the assumption that new firms are more innovative.
Solomon, Institutional Investors: Stock Market Impact and Corporate Control, 42 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 761, 779 (1974). See, e.g., Hearings on Financial Markets Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Markets of the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Abe Fortas,
counsel to the Committee on Publicly Owned Companies, stated:
Our economy and the American way of life depend on the existence and the en-
couragement of thousands of small independent enterprises that grow. That is the
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Id. at 169.
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AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 30-33 (1951); Adams & Dirlan, Big Steel, Invention and Inno-
vation, 80 Q.J. ECON. 167 (1966); Grabowski, The Determinants of Industrial Research
and Development: A Study of the Chemical, Drug and Petroleum Industries, 76 J. POL.
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to innovation. McNulty, On Firm Size and Innovation in the Schumpeterian System, 8
J. o ECON. ISSUES 627 (1974). In a recent analysis of the Schumpeterian hypothesis,
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economic growth was not firm size, which was in Schumpeter's words, "a secondary element,"
but rather the quality and especially the "newness" of the firm's entrepreneurship. So far
as market structure is concerned, then, the relevant variable in Schumpeter's view was the
condition of entry. According to 'McNulty, Schumpeter's position was as follows:
Where the entry of significant competitors (in an industry) appears to be impossible,
innovation will be slow; when the entry of significant competitors is possible, inno-
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Id. at 630.
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at 8, col. 5. See also Willat, Decline and Fall? Free Enterprise Is Tottering in the United
Kingdom, BARRON'S, Jan. 13, 1975, at 11; Wall St. J., May 2, 1975, at 3, col. 2. For develop-
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British Prime Minister Harold Wilson has recently proposed that an analysis be under-
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greatest endeavor is the takeover of British Leyland.."' Several grounds were
proposed as a basis for nationalization of ailing industries, including the threat
of investors from a foreign country acquiring control over a firm, or the need
to infuse funds into a financially troubled entity that is a source of national
prestige. It remains unclear whether the United States, even if it adopted a
massive program of financial assistance to business, would use such a plan as a
means to nationalize ownership.
IV. Conclusion
Assuming that a policy to encourage growth in the American economy
will exist, that corporate capital needs will continue to increase, and that such
needs in some industries will not be met through retained earnings, depreciation,
or the private capital market, it is recommended that further tax breaks not be
used to make available additional funds to business. Utilization of the tax
mechanism, as an indirect subsidy to business, obscures knowledge of the cost
from public purview.
The federal government possesses both the tools, based in part on the
experience of other countries in economic planning and credit allocation, and
the financial ability to aid certain industries and firms facing capital shortage
or the threat of financial ruin. A rational ordering of priorities, however, must
first take place at the executive and legislative levels so that allocation of funds
is not left to the unfettered discretion of a federal administrative agency. If the
federal government engages in additional borrowing to fund an agency, such
action will itself probably squeeze the capital market further, thereby limiting
the funds available to other enterprises.
The capital needs of certain crucial industries, like energy, which may
be critical to America's future development, should not be left to the vagaries
of retained earnings or the capital market. The latter mechanism lacks the
ability to assess the social costs or the future consequences of a project; the
need for a nonmarket decision should be faced. Implicit in this conclusion
taken of key British industries over a 5-year period to identify those firms that are likely to be
successful, as well as those that are critical for other industries and the economy in general.
The plan is designed to more effectively use government financial assistance to business and
to ensure that industry earns sufficient profits. Kilborn, Britain to Stress Industry in Shift of
Economic Aim, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
239 British Leyland, England's largest automaker, largest exporter, and biggest private
employer (170,000 workers), first sought help from its pressing financial problems in De-
cember 1974. At that time then Secretary of Industry, Anthony Wedgewood Benn, announced
a multimillion pound rescue operation for British Leyland in return for an unspecified share-
holding in the company. In return for an initial 50-million pound lifeline, British Leyland
effectively came under government control. The British Leyland board agreed that the Min-
ister of Industry's consent was required for the following: any capital expenditures over one
million pounds, any further major borrowings, or the sale of any part of the business. In
addition, the Minister of Industry would be consulted concerng any major wage negotiations,
dividend payments, and service contracts for directors. See Hillmore, Government Controls
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Control, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1975, at 45, col. 1; Manchester Guardian, Dec. 14, 1974, at 9,
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is the assumption that a federal agency making decisions as to allocation of
funds can do so free from political influence.24
Finally, in the case of larger firms and more ambitious projects, consider-
ation should be given to advancing funds in the form of equity investments, so
that in an inflationary and hopefully expanding economy the Government might
benefit from the success of firms so aided, and not receive repayment in depre-
ciated dollars.
All that has been said to this point assumes that the American corporation
and the general economy should and will continue to grow.24 Corporate growth,
however, may be an addiction: the stronger it gets, the greater the need and
dependency. In a few years, the incremental advantages of private capital
investment might be exceeded by the disadvantages of environmental destruc-
tion, technological unemployment, and economic crises. Like other addictions,
growth is at least in part a habit acquired in an attempt to avoid responsibilities
and obligations.242
The current economic difficulties, which combine inflation, unemployment,
and the specter of resource scarcities, may be viewed as placing a damper on
fundamental inquiries. Yet this time of doubt, characterized by the prospect of
capital shortages and the plight of failing business, may provide an unparalleled
opportunity for a fundamental reexamination of American society, its institu-
tions, and values. This should include further questioning of the mania for
growth, the lack of concern for natural resources, and the organizational appa-
ratus in which an increasingly skilled and educated work force must toil.
240 But see Burnham, Greenspan Asserts Energy Loan Plan Could Have Potential for
Corruption, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1975, at 7, col. 1.
241 For an analysis of the reasons for continued corporate growth, see J. GALBarrH,
ECONOMICS & THE PUBLIC PURPosE (1973).
242 W. LEviNsoN, CAPITAL, INFLATION, AND THE MULTINATIONALS 137 (1971).
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